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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of informed choice is a matter of considerable importance
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1. The duty of the physician to provide the patient sufficient information for making an in-
formed choice about therapy is a relatively new phenomenon in the law. The North Carolina
Supreme Court apparently provided the earliest American reference to such a duty. Hunt v. Brad-
shaw, 242 N.C. 517, 523, 88 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1955). There, the court suggested that the doctor's
failure to explain the risk of paralysis from a surgical procedure "may be considered a mistake on the
part of the surgeon." However, the court quickly retreated from this suggestion and dealt with the
plaintiff's claim on malpractice grounds alone. Interestingly, as late as 1956, noted legal thinkers
such as Harry Kalven, Jr. and Morris Ploscowe-writing in a symposium on morals, medicine, and
the law--believed that a legal remedy should not enforce a patient's right to know whether he is
suffering from a fatal disease. Kalven asserted: "This is simply an extreme instance of the grossness
and inappropriateness of a legal remedy in much of the area of harms to dignity and emotional
tranquility." Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties. A Legal View I, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1223,
1224 (1956). Ploscowe was even more strident:
Even if we were to assume that medical diagnosis is "truth" which a patient has a right to
know, it is a little difficult to see how the right to such a truth can be enforced by the heavy-
handed legal techniques of complaint, answer, bill of particulars, examination before trial, and
trial by jury with its conflicting expert testimony. Nor do I see how the alleged harm done to
the patient by his failure to know can be measured. Tort law is already too full of situations in
which vague standards for measuring damages are applied. I see no decisive reasons for intro-
ducing another vague basis for tort liability. I believe that how much the doctor should tell a
patient must be left to the doctor's conscience and the canons of medical ethics, and that this is
not an area for legal interference.
Ploscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal View II, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238,
1240 (1956). Prosser, in his torts hornbook, made no reference whatsoever to a cause of action for
informed consent. H. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955).
The first serious scholarly discussion clearly advocating an informed consent cause of action
was McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV.
381, 426-30 (1957). Earlier comments were far too tentative and limited to influence the develop-
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products liability.2 Unlike the more basic issue of consent, which focuses
on the willingness of the plaintiff to undergo a therapeutic procedure or
to purchase a product, the informed choice question asks whether the
doctor or vendor provided the patient or buyer adequate information to
make an intelligent choice. The consequence of a finding that adequate
information was not given, under current doctrine, is that the party with
the duty of providing information is liable for all personal injury damages
flowing from the ill-informed decision.'
The classic tort model for informed consent litigation, while simple
in theory, is seriously flawed in practice. The model depends on con-
structing a causal bridge between the absence of the information and the
decision of the plaintiff to proceed with the therapy or use the product.
Except in the most blatant situations, the causal relationship between
inadequate information and plaintiff decision making is, we shall demon-
strate, not practically justiciable.4 The law does and can only consider
the information the health professional or product vendor should deliver.
It does not and cannot consider the multitude of factors that influence
the way people actually make decisions. To decide causation without
looking at the latter is wholly illusory. On the other hand, to insist on
such an inquiry would involve the courts in the kind of investigation of
human behavior that would seriously compromise the judicial process.
As long as courts and scholars insist on measuring informed consent
damages by focusing on the resultant personal injuries, they cannot es-
cape the causation dilemma. In recognizing the essential nonjusticiabil-
ment of the law. See, e.g., Lund, The Doctor, The Patient and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REV. 344
(1946); Smith, Therapeutic Privilege To Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patients Sick With Serious
or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946). A California appellate court first coined the term
"informed consent" in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
2. The courts developed an informed choice action in products liability almost a decade after
the onset of the products liability revolution. The first case to refer to an informed choice theory was
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 719 U.S. 869
(1974). Several early commentators distinguished between warnings to reduce the risk of harm-
risk reduction warnings-and warnings only to inform the purchaser that use of the product in-
volves a nonreducible risk-informed choice warnings. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The
Use and Abuse of Warnings-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 519
(1976) [hereinafter Twerski]. Others now recognize this distinction. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN & R.
RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 609-11 (3d ed. 1983); J. HEN-
DERSON & A. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 365, 459 (1987). See
infra text accompanying notes 54-69 for a discussion of the product liability informed choice cases.
3. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. This article focuses exclusively on informed
choice warnings and does not address warnings that reduce risk by alerting the person warned to
alter his behavior so that the undesired result does not take place. These risk reduction warnings
raise a separate set of problems that are well beyond the scope of this article.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 70-140. In this article, we use the term "justiciability"
to connote the institutional ability of courts to make a coherent, reliable decision with respect to an
issue. While legal writers commonly use the term to describe issues concerning the article III power
of federal courts, we refer not to that narrow meaning, but rather, to its more general meaning. See,
e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices.: The Limits of Adjudi-
cation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Twerski, From Risk Utility to Consumer Expectation: En-
hancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Products Liability Litigation, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 861
(1983).
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ity of this personal injury model for informed choice cases, we do not
suggest that this genre of litigation be obliterated. Instead, we suggest a
radical restructuring of the informed choice doctrine. Rather than focus-
ing on personal injury damages flowing from the hypothetical "but for,"
which seeks to determine what the plaintiff would have decided had the
defendant provided the information, we suggest that courts should iden-
tify and value the decision rights of the plaintiff which the defendant
destroyed by withholding adequate information.
Once the blinding light of spectacular personal injury damages is
removed, the interests protected by the informed choice doctrine can be
clearly seen. The right to participate in, and indeed, make important
decisions concerning one's health is a critical element of personal auton-
omy. The value of this process right is largely independent of the ulti-
mate decision. In its exclusive focus on determining personal injury
damages, the legal system has largely overlooked these process rights.
The legal system should protect these rights and provide significant rec-
ompense for their invasion, rather than continue its single-minded and
ill-considered attention to personal injuries allegedly caused by the lack
of information.
Many commentators have criticized, some bitterly, the existing
structure for informed choice litigation.5 However, even those commen-
tators who have been most sensitive to the failure of the present doctrinal
structure.to protect autonomy have been unwilling to confront the conse-
quences of their own analyses.6 By structuring the informed choice cause
of action around putatively consequential personal injury damages, they
have compromised the goal of patient and consumer autonomy by foster-
ing litigation of a causation issue that is not practically justiciable. By
focusing on the identification and valuation of decision-making rights, on
the other hand, the cause of action for informed choice would emerge
considerably leaner, but stronger. Moreover, the cause of action would
have an important asset: it would be honest. Viewed as a process right,
informed choice would be freed from internal contradictions and incon-
sistencies7 which ofttimes make it the object of derision and the subject of
counterintuitive assertions. With the proper model, informed choice
may yet enhance the goals of patient and consumer autonomy.
II. INFORMED CHOICE: A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
A. Medical Informed Consent
Today, the broad outlines of tort doctrine concerning patient auton-
omy and medical choice are rather well settled.8 In those rare instances
5. See infra note 29.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31.
8. The literature dealing with the informed consent doctrine is staggering in volume. A good
review of the contours of the law can be found in P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED
No. 3]
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where a patient complains that a doctor performed a medical procedure
upon him without the patient agreeing to the intervention, the patient
may prosecute his case using classical battery theory. 9 Courts deem the
unwanted and unconsented touching by the physician sufficiently egre-
gious that they have assimilated the conduct of even a well-intentioned
doctor to the more violent and antisocial acts of those wrongdoers more
usually associated with intentional torts.10 Typically, however, patients
consent to medical procedures, and doctors do not venture beyond con-
sented-to therapy.1' Rather, the more common claim of a patient is that
the doctor inadequately warned of the risks of a given medical interven-
tion, or that the doctor did not adequately explain alternative modes of
treatment (including the option of nontreatment).12 Hence, the plaintiff
CONSENT chs. 3, 6 (1987) [hereinafter P. APPELBAUM]; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189-92 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]; Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV.
137 (1977); Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219, 223-29 (1985); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy For the Doctor-Pa-
tient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). A succinct analysis of the law, providing a state-by-
state compilation of the differing rules, is found in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN
THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP app. L (1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS].
9. Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N.W. 12 (1905); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754
(1956). Where a patient consents to a medical intervention based on a willful misrepresentation by
the doctor of risks involved, a battery action also is warranted. Spikes v. Heath, 175 Ga. App. 187,
332 S.E.2d 889 (Ct. App. 1985).
10. But even in these cases, where the scope of consent is at issue, the courts are not free from
ambivalence. In Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Minn. 1981), the court noted discomfort
in extending the battery theory to a case where the plaintiff alleged that the doctor had undertaken a
somewhat more extensive form of breast surgery than the one to which the patient had consented.
In holding that the trial court did not err in submitting the battery issue to the jury, the court said
that submitting the case on negligent nondisclosure grounds would have been preferable, because
"battery is better utilized in the classic situation of a touching of a substantially and obviously differ-
ent kind," rather than one "where the focus is more on the extent of the surgery performed." In an
interesting variation on the scope-of-consent issue, one court found that a surgeon's performance of a
less radical form of surgery when the patient understood that he would be undergoing a more radical
procedure also constituted a battery. Cathemer v. Hunter, 27 Ariz. App. 780, 558 P.2d 975 (Ct.
App. 1977). In his early work on the subject, Professor McCoid stated that even in cases where the
doctor exceeded the consent of the patient, liability should depend on whether the physician violated
the "reasonable and prudent doctor" standard. McCoid, supra note 1, at 422-34.
11. We exclude from discussion the problems that arise when doctors treat patients in emer-
gency situations when the patient is incapable of communicating her consent or where, due to age or
other incapacity, others must step in and act as the patient's surrogate. See I MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, ch. 9; Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision Making, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.
These issues continue to arise with some frequency. See, e.g., Stafford v. Louisiana State Univ., 448
So. 2d 852 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (whether true emergency occasioned amputation of patient's leg);
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (whether consent of a mature minor under the
age of 18 was effective to negate a claim of battery).
12. In an exhaustive piece of scholarship, Shultz, supra note 8, the author argues the most
serious deprivations of patient choice arise from the failure of doctors to present to the patient
information concerning alternative forms of treatment, options of nontreatment, and more sophisti-
cated modes of diagnosis. She contends that courts often do not recognize these invasions of patient
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charges lack of informed consent to the treatment.
One might expect that if informed consent was not obtained, the
courts would have recognized a cause of action for battery on behalf of
the ill-informed patient. If the physician violated a duty to inform the
patient of risks and alternatives to the recommended therapy such that
the consent was effectively vitiated ab initio, then the doctor's touching
of the plaintiff was unwanted and offensive. 3 Nonetheless, the vast ma-
jority of courts have refused to adopt this approach.' 4 The conduct of a
treating physician using sound medical technique is too far removed
from that of the classic batterer for the use of such terminology.t5 More
importantly, the elements of such a cause of action would be significantly
autonomy because they may not be accompanied by a doctor's "touching" of the patient. Id. at 229-
48. The author argues for an outright recognition of an independent right of informed choice, not
tied to classic battery or negligence theory.
13. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 18, at 120 & nn.66-67. Where outright misrepre-
sentation of material facts induces consent, then courts still occasionally recognize battery. E.g.,
Spikes v. Heath, 175 Ga. App. 187, 332 S.E.2d 889 (Ct. App. 1985). A few courts, in administering
a negligence-based informed consent doctrine, couch liability in battery terms. See, e.g., Cardwell v.
Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 750-51 (Tenn. 1987).
14. P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 118 ("The dispute over whether a lawsuit alleging lack of
informed consent ought to be treated as a battery or as professional negligence has slowly withered
away. By the mid-1970s, almost all states that had considered the question had concluded that
inadequate disclosure is actionable only as professional negligence, not battery."). See, e.g., Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554, 557 (Okla. 1979); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 598-600, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13
(1973). Occasionally, courts lapse into battery language. See, e.g., Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio
Misc. 95, 102, 308 N.E.2d 765, 770 (Ct. C.P. 1973); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 750
(Tenn. 1987) ("[W]hile determining whether the Defendant failed to obtain informed consent is
dependent upon the standard of care of the profession .... [the absence of informed consent] is not
negligence but battery .... ").
15. P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 114-15; Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 592-95. In Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 598-99, 207 N.W.2d 297,
312-13 (1973), the court set forth the following reasons for refusing to adopt an intentional tort
theory in an informed consent action where the doctor failed to disclose collateral risks:
First, the act complained of in these cases simply does not fit comfortably within the traditional
concepts of battery-the intent to unlawfully touch the person of another. In cases such as the
instant one, physicians are invariably acting in good faith and for the benefit of the patient.
While the result may not be that desired, the act complained of is surely not of an antisocial
nature usually associated with the tort of assault and battery or battery. While the unauthor-
ized removal of an organ yet fits the concept of battery, the failure to adequately advise of
potential negative ramifications of a treatment does not. Second, and related to the first, the
failure to inform a patient is probably not, in the usual case, an intentional act and hence not
within the traditional concept of intentional torts. Third, the act complained of in informed
consent cases is not within the traditional idea of "contact" or "touching." In the typical situa-
tion, as here, the physician impeccably performs the surgery or other treatment. Complained of
are the personal reactions to such treatment which are unanticipated by the patient. Thus, for
example, the instant drug therapy is not alleged to be an unpermitted touching but rather, the
plaintiff alleges he ought to have been advised of the possibility of hepatitis which occurs with-
out fault on anyone's part. Fourth, a valid question exists with respect to whether a physician's
malpractice insurance covers liability for an arguably "criminal" act-battery. If not, it may be
asked why a physician should be required to pay out of his own pocket for what is essentially an
act of negligence-failing to inform a patient of the risks indigenous to the treatment? Fifth,
these essentially negligence cases do not fit the traditional mold of situations wherein punitive
damages can be awarded. For these reasons, we conclude it is preferable to affirmatively recog-
nize a legal duty, bottomed upon a negligence theory of liability, in cases wherein it is alleged
the patient-plaintiff was not informed adequately of the ramifications of a course of treatment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
No. 3]
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different from those of a classical intentional tort, such as battery. After
all, before one can determine whether the patient's consent is void due to
lack of information, one must make a critical intermediate determina-
tion-how much information the patient has the right to know. Regard-
less of the standard for judging the adequacy of the information
("reasonable professional" or "reasonable patient"16), a close and diffi-
cult judgment call is a necessary requisite to a finding of liability. To say
that a doctor who falls short of meeting a reasonableness standard is
thereby transformed into an intentional tort-feasor does not seem consis-
tent with the traditional perception of an intentional tort.
17
Once courts had dismissed battery as a viable theory for informed
consent, choosing negligence as the dominant approach was fully under-
standable. In the early years of the informed consent doctrine, courts
almost exclusively used the self-same standard governing the more tradi-
tional tort of medical malpractice-the "reasonable doctor" test-as the
standard of appropriate disclosure. 8 This test almost invariably re-
16. See infra text accompanying notes 18-26.
17. When determining whether a defendant is liable for an intentional tort, courts often litigate
the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. The issue does not arise, however, in the
prima facie case, but rather, in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to claim some privilege or
justification, such as self-defense or defense of property. See Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa
1971); Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 (1914); Keep v. Quallman, 68 Wis. 451, 32
N.W. 233 (1887).
In one instance, the issue of reasonableness does become a part of the prima facie intentional
tort case. Hornbook law states that the plaintiff must allege and prove that she did not consent to
the act constituting the intentional tort. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 3.10 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 18. If a reasonable person would have
determined that the plaintiff consented, then consent is established, even if the plaintiff was not truly
willing to let the defendant invade her rights. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E.
266 (1891); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979). Apparently, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that a reasonable person would not have concluded that plaintiff's conduct signified assent to the
tort.
Though the reasonableness issue plays some role in classic intentional tort litigation, its role in
informed consent litigation is decidedly different in character. Unlike the privilege cases, the reason-
ableness issue in informed consent goes to the establishment of the tort and not the affirmative
defense. Nor are the cases requiring plaintiff to negate consent analogous to the informed consent
issue. In the former, plaintiff need only establish that his conduct could not be interpreted as grant-
ing consent in the eyes of an objectively reasonable person. Questions of significant judgment are not
implicated. Reasonableness serves an interpretive role, rather than serving as a normative standard.
The very opposite is the case in informed consent litigation.
18. The case credited with giving birth to the informed consent doctrine, Salgo v. Leland Stan-
ford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 573-75, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957), was vague as to the standard of disclosure. The court said that the physician has a duty to
disclose "any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to
the proposed treatment." Id. The court went on, however, to grant the physician "a certain amount
of discretion" with regard to the facts to be disclosed. Id. See Katz, supra note 8, at 149. The entire
discussion of informed consent in Salgo is embodied in one paragraph. There is little reason to
conclude that the court was aware that it was breaking new ground.
Beginning with Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960), the courts articulated that the standard for medical disclosure was that infor-
mation which a reasonable medical doctor would provide under the circumstances. See, e.g., Rush
v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir. 1981); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 363, 409 P.2d
74, 86 (Ct. App. 1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1966); Fuller v. Starnes,
268 Ark. 476, 478, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Ark. 1980); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. Dist.
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quired medical expert testimony as to what a prudent doctor would tell a
similarly situated patient.19 If the doctor unreasonably withheld infor-
mation about the risks of a recommended course of action, the doctor
was liable for the harm caused by the course of action if the patient
otherwise would have declined to proceed.2"
The confluence of the liability standard and the causation standard
causes some tension. The liability standard suggests that the patient has
a right to know certain risks, yet the causation standard only compen-
sates the patient when information about those risks would have pre-
vented the patient from taking the course of action.2' But, so long as the
reasonable doctor disclosure standard governed, the tension was tolera-
ble. Presumably, the only risks and alternatives that doctors had to dis-
close under this standard were those that gave the medical profession
some pause recommending the therapeutic intervention. Once this stan-
dard was violated, no great leap was necessary to allow the jury to re-
solve the causation issue. Fundamentally, the jury was being asked
whether the patient would have chosen a different, medically acceptable
course of action. Such hypothetical "but for" cases routinely find their
way to juries.22
Ct. App. 1965); see also Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's
Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3D 1008 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1975); Nishi v.
Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 202, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (1970); Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 573, 584, 360
N.E.2d 93, 101 (App. Ct. 1977); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 649, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88 (1979).
But see Leyson v. Steurmann, 5 Haw. App. 504, 705 P.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1985). See generally Annota-
tion, Necessity and Sufficiency of Expert Evidence to Establish Existence and Extent of Physician's
Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 52 A.L.R. 3D 1084 (1973).
20. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (Ct. App. 1965), modified, 2
Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1966); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 400, 350 P.2d 1093,
1099, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 191, 354 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1960). Courts and commentators,
writing in the pre-Canterbury era, paid scant attention to the causation issue. See P. APPELBAUM,
supra note 8, at 121-23. They seemed to assume that a subjective test would govern causation (i.e.,
would this patient have opted against the doctor's recommended therapy?). The plaintiff's credibil-
ity largely determined causation. The jury generally decided the issue. See Plante, An Analysis of
"Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 667 (1968); Recent Cases, Physicians and Sur-
geons-Physician's Duty to Warn of Possible Adverse Results of Proposed Treatment Depends on Gen-
eral Practice Followed by Medical Profession in the Community, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1449
(1962). But see Waltz & Scheunemann, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 646-
47 (1969).
2 1. The source of tension between the liability standard and the causation standard arises from
the fact that the standard of disclosure is, ex ante, designed to give the patient decision-making
power. The ex post causation standard somewhat undermines this empowering of the patient by
limiting the decision-making right to only those cases in which the patient would have made a con-
trary decision. Given the fact that the reasonable doctor disclosure standard limited the patient's
choice only to good medical alternatives, juries normally had free rein to conclude that the doctor
had, in fact, breached the liability standard. Using a subjective causation standard provided some
limitation, but the choice between only good alternatives likely resulted in causation being a jury
issue in almost all cases. Therefore, though a significant theoretical distinction between the rights-
oriented liability standard and the results-oriented causation standard existed, in practice, the vast
majority of cases with inadequate disclosure went to juries on a causation question with the credibil-
ity of the plaintiff as the only significant limiting factor.
22. The literature has extensively discussed the accordionlike quality of the cause-in-fact issue.
See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 132-34 (2d ed. 1981); PROSSER &
No. 3]
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With the coming of Canterbury v. Spence23 and its progeny,24 the
strain between the liability and causation standards reached the breaking
point. Canterbury significantly changed the contours of the physician's
duty to disclose material risks to the patient. Canterbury defined a risk
as material if a "reasonable person" in the patient's position would wish
to know it prior to making a decision.2" Thus, a patient's right to infor-
mation is no longer dictated by the medical profession's assessment of
which risks and alternatives to treatment are worthy of consideration.26
A much broader range of disclosure is now required.' Yet, Canterbury
held that even if the doctor fails to disclose a material risk, liability does
not attach unless a "prudent person" in the plaintiff's position would, if
given the requisite information, choose against the therapy actually un-
dertaken.28 That the test for causation undermines the liability standard
is hardly debatable.29 A patient's right is not measured by what a rea-
sonable person in the patient's position would want to know prior to
KEETON, supra note 8, § 41, at 270; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60
(1958).
23. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852
(Ct. App. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
25. The court adopted the test suggested by Waltz & Scheunemann, supra note 20, at 640,
which provides that "[a] risk is ... material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows
or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or
cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy." Canterbury 464 F.2d at
787 (quoting Waltz & Scheunemann, supra note 20, at 640).
26. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785; see P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 43-47; 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. L, at 194-95. The courts that have adopted the "rea-
sonable patient" standard have also dispensed with the requirement that the plaintiff call expert
witnesses to establish the medical standard for disclosure. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792; Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14 (1972); Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 446-47, 379 A.2d 1014, 1023-24 (1977); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552,
557, 349 A.2d 703, 706 (1975).
27. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-88. Rejection of the medical disclosure standard clearly
envisages significantly broader disclosure based on a layman's right to know.
28. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 516-17 (1972); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392-93 (Miss. 1985). A large majority of
courts that have adopted the Canterbury test, which judges materiality by a lay rather than a medical
standard, followed this view on causation. See 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8,
app. L, at 197, 206-45. Only a small minority of the decisions following Canterbury test causation by
a subjective standard (i.e., what would this particular patient have decided if provided with the
requisite information?). Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Aina v. Gingrich, 84 Or.
App. 25, 733 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1987); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628-29, 295 A.2d 676, 690
(1972).
29. See P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 122 ("By conditioning the availability of compensa-
tion on the congruence between the patient's own decision and what a so-called reasonable person
would have decided, the objective test undercuts a patient's right of self-determination."). Many
commentators have voiced similar criticism. See, e.g., J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR
AND PATIENT 79-80 (1984); Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 87, 121 n.72 (1976); Goldstein, For Harold Laswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); Katz, supra
note 8, at 160-64; Riskin, supra note 15, at 589-90; Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
621, 623-24 (1986); Shultz, supra note 8, at 249-51; see also Koopersmith, Informed Consent: The
Problem of Causation, 3 MED. & LAW 231 (1984).
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decision making. Instead, the combined effect of the standards of disclo-
sure and causation is that, for all practical purposes, a patient is only
entitled to information which would lead a reasonable patient to choose
against the doctor's recommended therapy. Because the recommended
therapy is, by hypothesis, reasonable (if not, the case would lie in mal-
practice, not informed consent), the likelihood that a patient will estab-
lish causation is remote. Most reasonable patients do follow the advice
of their reasonable doctors.30 Thus, although the reasonable patient test
for liability now requires more disclosure, the reasonable patient test for
causation results in fewer findings of causation.
One wonders why the Canterbury court took the trouble to establish
a new liability standard so easily undone by the accompanying causation
standard. This approach certainly sends a mixed and highly confusing
message to the medical profession. Even more puzzling is the Canter-
bury court's willingness to create a liability standard and, in the same
decision, define causation in a manner which, in direct language, puts the
lie to the just-articulated liability standard. Normally, only the passage
of time reveals the inconsistencies which call our attention to unresolved
tensions in the law. Rarely do they follow in the same paragraph, and
rarer yet do such inconsistencies continue in the courts for years on end
without being recognized.3'
Commentators have speculated about why the negligence analysis
has persevered. Some have suggested that the negligence-causation link
is necessary to prevent large recoveries when the plaintiff was not genu-
30. At least juries will likely so conclude. See Riskin, supra note 15, at 589-90; Shultz, supra
note 8, at 250.
In the pre-Canterbury era, courts established a narrower objective test for materiality ("reason-
able doctor") and a broad-based test for causation ("subjective patient"). Canterbury appears to be a
mirror image of the older case law. It created a broad test for materiality ("reasonable patient") and
a narrower objective test for causation (what a "reasonable patient" would have chosen). Since the
causation test is tied to the choice of a "reasonable patient" and such patients are usually heavily
influenced by medical recommendations, the causation test is very much governed by a professional
standard.
31. As noted supra note 28 and accompanying text, the vast majority of courts have adopted
an objective test for causation. Judicial opinions spelling out the internal contradictions are rare.
Only two cases appear to have seriously grappled with the problem. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554
(Okla. 1979); Arina v. Gingrich, 84 Or. App. 25, 30-31, 733 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 1987). The
discussion in Arina is especially perceptive. The court noted:
There are analytical as well as philosophical problems with the objective test. As noted,
the standard for disclosure is whether the risk or alternative would be material to a reasonable
patient's decision. That being so, whether a hypothetical reasonable patient's consent was
caused by the nondisclosure of a particular material fact is either a self-answering question or an
unanswerable one. It is circular to say both that a fact can be material to a reasonable person's
decision and that the person would have made the same decision whether or not the person was
aware of the fact.
However, the most fundamental problem with the objective test is that it poses the wrong
question to the factfinder. Whether a defendant's negligence caused a plaintiff's injury is, by its
nature, a case-specific question. We are aware of no other context in which it has been sug-
gested that the jury should resolve a question of causation on the basis of a hypothetical effect
that a hypothetical defendant's act is likely to have on a hypothetical plaintiff, rather than base
its decision on whether the actual defendant's act was the cause of harm to the actual plaintiff.
84 Or. App. at 30-31, 733 P.2d at 78.
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inely injured. a2 By contrast, analyzing informed consent cases under the
rubric of battery, which protects the dignitary interest of autonomy,
would recognize a cause of action even without actual harm.33 We disa-
gree. In our opinion, the courts have tolerated, and indeed exacerbated,
the internal contradictions of a negligence theory because only a theory
that requires a finding of a genuine injury from the wrong would trigger
real and substantial personal injury damage recoveries. Any theory
which focuses on the violation of the right to autonomous decision mak-
ing might yield only trivial dignitary tort damages.34 In short, we sug-
gest that the desire to compensate plaintiffs for injuries from uninformed
treatment decisions has fueled the engine that has driven the develop-
ment of the theoretical structure.
Two postulates lie at the heart of the prevailing thinking. Both are
seriously in error. First, there is a belief that the causation issue-which
focuses on what either this plaintiff or a reasonable plaintiff would have
done had the defendant provided the desired information-is readily jus-
ticiable. As we shall demonstrate, playing out hypothetical human deci-
sion making in this context is virtually impossible. Second, the
prevailing model assumes that the right to autonomous decision making
has little or no value, standing alone. We shall argue that this right can
be valued and ought not be trivialized. The single-minded focus on per-
sonal injury damages as the payoff for informed consent litigation has
obscured the true injury done by removing informed decision making
from the patient. As long as the law continues to live with the illusion
that causation can be realistically litigated, it will be blinded by the opi-
ate of personal injury damages. After ridding ourselves of the non-
productive causation inquiry, we will be able to fashion a remedy that
honestly reflects the injury that takes place when the doctor violates the
decision rights of the patient.
1. Narrowing The Question
In evaluating informed consent doctrine, it is important to identify
carefully the classes of cases to which it meaningfully applies. To the
extent that classical medical malpractice analysis would make a physi-
cian liable for damages flowing from the treatment (or lack of treatment),
32. Plante, supra note 20, at 666-69; Riskin, supra note 15, at 584-85; Shultz, supra note 8, at
225, 232.
33. Plante, supra note 20, at 666-67; Riskin, supra note 15, at 584-85; Shultz, supra note 8, at
225, 232.
34. Many of the commentators who have argued for a theory of recovery which focuses on
protecting the right of patient autonomy have admitted that the violation of the dignitary right is
likely to be compensated by nominal damages only. See, e.g., P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 133;
Katz, supra note 8, at 161 n.76 (even the court in Dow v. Kaiser Found., 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90
Cal. Rptr. 747 (Ct. App. 1970) (opinion subsequently withdrawn), which correctly utilized a battery
theory, felt compelled to require the plaintiff to establish that had the doctor provided the informa-
tion, the plaintiff would not have consented).
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an informed consent action adds little to the plaintiff's arsenal.3 5 There-
fore, we will give little consideration to cases in which it was a violation
of minimum professional standards to perform or recommend the ther-
apy or lack of therapy at all, whether the risks of the procedure were
disclosed or not. In those cases, malpractice doctrine should adequately
compensate the patient.
The remaining cases, in which the informed consent doctrine is the
only avenue available to plaintiffs, are those cases where neither the selec-
tion nor the performance of the treatment was malpractice. Moreover, in
these cases the doctor did not fully disclose a risk inherent in the course
of treatment (or the potential risks and benefits of alternative treatment),
and the risk occurred, causing harm to the patient.36 In only this small
slice of unfortunate medical outcomes is the doctrine of informed con-
sent, as usually formulated, relevant.
As initially developed, the doctrine of informed consent followed the
traditional tort analysis of allowing recovery for damages proximately
caused by the violation of a duty. 37 The violation was the doctor's failure
to disclose certain risks of a medical procedure to the patient. The dam-
ages were the harm associated with the risk which occurred. The con-
nection between the two was the required causal chain-the failure to
disclose must have caused the harm. As usually conceptualized, the
chain had two links. First, the nondisclosure must have caused the pa-
tient to agree to a procedure which otherwise would have been declined
(decision causation); 38 second, the procedure must have caused the pa-
tient's harm (injury causation). 39 The second link is difficult;' ° the first
35. Theoretically, every classical medical malpractice case also raises a claim for informed
choice. A patient may claim a right to be informed that a doctor's negligent conduct may be harm-
ful so that he has the option to reject such negligent treatment. However, little is gained in so
formulating the cause of action.
36. For an example of such a situation, imagine a patient suffering from a stomach ulcer. The
physician recommends surgery to correct the problem. Performing the operation is generally ac-
cepted medical practice, so selection of that treatment was not malpractice. The physician then
performs the surgery competently, so no malpractice issue is present in this respect. Yet, the physi-
cian neglected to inform the patient that, in surgery of this sort, there is a five percent risk that
serious complications will develop. Unfortunately, the complications develop. For more about this
situation, see infra note 88.
37. See authorities cited supra note 20.
38. We borrow the terms "decision causation" and "injury causation" from Meisel & Kabnick,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prr. L. REV.
407, 438-39 (1980).
39. Id.
40. Injury causation focuses on the question of whether the medical procedure the physician
used actually caused the undesirable result. In cases in which a doctor improperly performs a medi-
cal procedure, this issue does not present great difficulties in fact-finding. This is why most of the
no-fault liability proposals which are predicated on identifying a "designated compensable event"
have focused on procedure-related malpractice. ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIAB.,
DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 28-29, 32 (1979); Tancredi,
Designing A No-Fault Alternative, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277, 280-82. In the
"missed diagnoses" or "failure-to-treat-properly" cases, however, ascertaining whether the medical
"omission" was responsible for a worsening of the plaintiff's condition is often difficult. See
HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, MEDICAL CARE AND MEDICAL INJURIES IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
link, however, is hopelessly complex.
In considering whether the failure to disclose risks was a "but for"
cause of the patient's decision to agree to the procedure, it is important to
remember how narrow the class of informed consent cases is. If the deci-
sion to recommend and perform the procedure was not itself malpractice,
a hypothetical reasonable decision maker, taking into account all the
risks and benefits of the procedure, would, at the least, not reject the
procedure out of hand. Thus, to find that had the actual patient known
of the risks of the procedure she would have declined the procedure, a
fact finder must believe either that a reasonable decision maker ulti-
mately would have declined the procedure (although not rejecting it out
of hand) or that the patient would have made a decision different than
that of our hypothetical decision maker.
Two factors could explain a difference in decision making between
the patient and our hypothetical decision maker. First, the patient might
give the potential costs and benefits of the procedure different weights
than would the hypothetical decision maker. Thus, by using a decision-
making mechanism as rational as that of the hypothetical decision
maker, the patient could arrive at an alternative choice.41 Second, the
patient might make decisions in an irrational way.42
STATE OF NEW YORK: A PILOT STUDY 28-30 (1987). Considerable judicial and scholarly discus-
sion has focused on the role of causation in this genre of cases. See Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958
(10th Cir. 1986) (predicting that New Mexico would reject right to recover for deprivation of lost
chance due to physician's malpractice); May v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1985)
(recognizing cause of action for a reduction of chance of recovery by 25%); Hershkovitz v. Group
Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) (recognizing a cause of action when delayed
diagnosis of lung cancer reduced plaintiff's chance of recovery by 14%); King, Causation, Valuation
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Note, Loss of Chance: Who Can Recover in Missouri?, 52 Mo. L. REV. 223
(1987); Comment, Alfonso v. Lund.- Loss of Chance Rejected As A Basis for Medical Malpractice, 12
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 187 (1987).
To decide injury causation in the context of an informed consent case, it is necessary to make a
finding as to the consequences that would have resulted had the plaintiff chosen against the doctor's
recommended intervention (or nonintervention). See Epstein, supra note 29, at 121-25; Shultz, supra
note 8, at 288-91. In addition to this determination, a finding on decision causation requires deter-
mining the likelihood that the plaintiff would, in fact, have chosen an alternative path for treatment.
On this point, Shultz admits that fact-finding is difficult. Shultz, supra note 8, at 287-88. The thesis
of this article is that decision causation is more than just difficult; it is hopelessly nonjusticiable. See
infra text accompanying notes 70-140.
Moreover, probabilistic causation theories do not solve the problem. Even the most enthusiastic
proponents of such models use them primarily to advocate novel legal solutions to situations with
known (or presumed) probabilistic contours. E.g., Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensa-
tion for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985). The problem in decision causation, on the
other hand, is that we cannot realistically determine, even approximately, what the probabilities are.
Probabilistic causation models do not provide this information. Thus, an additional advantage of the
process model we advocate is that it does not require factual findings on such indeterminate, hypo-
thetical issues. See infra text accompanying notes 141-93.
41. See P. APPELBAUM, supra note 8, at 43-47; J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR
AND PATIENT 95-100 (1984); 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 42-43.
42. By this, we do not mean to denigrate the right to make decisions on totally irrational
grounds. We mean to make the point that absent special knowledge by the doctor of a patient's
proclivity to make decisions in this manner, courts are unlikely to concern themselves with a pa-
tient's irrationality. A clear example of such nonrational decision making would be the desire to
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Thus, to prove the first link of the causal chain--decision causa-
tion-the patient must demonstrate either (1) that a reasonable decision
maker would have rejected the reasonable-to-propose procedure, (2) that
the patient attaches different weights to the costs or benefits or degrees of
risk associated with the procedure than would the hypothetical decision
maker, or (3) that the patient makes choices in a nonrational manner.
Quite obviously, the problems of hindsight-aided proof are enormous.
Canterbury v. Spence was itself a response to some of these
problems. The court, in that case, recognized the difficulty in proving ex
post whether a patient harmed by a procedure would have agreed to it
had he known its risks.4" Focusing primarily on the credibility problems
involved in statements by a patient who has already been injured by a
procedure as to what decision he would have made had he been informed
of the risk of injury, but not the certainty of injury, the Canterbury court
severely limited the ability of a patient to prove causation. By adopting a
"prudent person in the patient's position" test," the court eliminated the
third way, described above, to establish the causal link and cast signifi-
cant doubt on the second.45 Thus, under Canterbury, a patient can pre-
vail on an informed consent claim only if a reasonable patient, after being
appropriately informed of the risks of a procedure which is safe enough
to be reasonable to propose, would decline the procedure nonetheless.
Canterbury has multiple problems. First, in the name of credible
fact-finding, it prevents plaintiffs who actually would have declined a
procedure that a reasonable person would have accepted from recovering
damages. Second, it leaves for the realm of informed consent only that
limited class of cases in which a performed procedure was reasonable to
propose but would have been rejected by a reasonable patient. Third,
and most importantly, it rests on the implicit assumption that we can say
with some degree of confidence what a reasonable decision maker would
have done when presented with the appropriate risk and benefit informa-
undergo an alternative treatment because it was discovered by a Republican rather than a Democrat.
But see N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1981, at A1, col. 6, A3, col. 3 (reporting that following the assassina-
tion attempt on President Reagan, when he was brought into surgery, Mr. Reagan eyed the surgeons
and said, "Please tell me you're Republicans.").
43. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
44. 464 F.2d at 791.
45. The key to understanding how much subjectivity remains in the formulation of the Canter-
bury causation standard is the weight to be given to the words "what a prudent person in the pa-
tient's position would have decided." 464 F.2d at 791 (emphasis added). Some commentators seem
to conclude that it is wholly an objective standard that totally undermines the materiality test. See
Katz, supra note 8, at 160-64; Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negli-
gence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51, 107-13 (1977); Riskin,
supra note 15, at 589. Yet, courts, by permitting the plaintiff to testify as to what decision he would
have made, have apparently allowed the jury to consider some elements of individual value in decid-
ing what a "prudent person in the patient's position" would have done. Perhaps by combining
"prudent person" and "patient's position" within one test the Canterbury court acknowledged that it
would allow the jury to consider some value differences and not others. The value preferences which
border on the idiosyncratic will most likely not withstand "prudent person" scrutiny.
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tion concerning the procedure. As this article will demonstrate, that as-
sumption is almost totally erroneous.
Canterbury represents an attempt, however unsuccessful, to deal
with the problem of decision causation in informed consent. Implicit in
Canterbury-and also, for that matter, in cases which reject Canterbury
and utilize a subjective standard of decision causation 4 6-is a statement
about the interest the informed consent doctrine protects. Despite its
partial ancestry in the law of battery, informed consent, as seen by most
courts, protects the same interest malpractice and other negligence torts
protect-the interest in being free of injury caused by unreasonable
action.
A number of commentators, however, have suggested that the
courts are wrong in treating informed consent as just another branch of
negligent medical practice. These commentators, led initially by Jay
Katz4 7 and more recently by Marjorie Shultz,48 argue forcefully and per-
suasively that the interest protected by the informed consent doctrine
ought to be the patient's interest in autonomy-that is, the right to make
an informed choice about medical care. Yet, curiously, when it comes to
determining damages for interference with that important interest, many
of these commentators are silent49 or ambivalent about how to value the
interest.50
46. See authorities cited supra note 28.
47. The work of Jay Katz has been enormously influential in highlighting the importance of
patient autonomy. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); Katz,
supra note 8. For a multifaceted review and critique of Professor Katz's work, see Symposium:
Perspectives on Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1-226
(1987).
48. Shultz, supra note 8.
49. For example, in his influential article on informed consent, Professor Katz relegates the
discussion of damages to a footnote. See Katz, supra note 8, at 161 n.76. In that revealing footnote,
Katz recognizes that when the doctor violates the patient's pure dignitary right to be informed, a
court is likely to award only nominal damages. He then argues that the traditional causation rule
requiring a showing of "altered conduct" on the part of the plaintiff may still be necessary. Id. He
says:
[D]iscarding the rule of altered conduct with respect to dignitary injury does not necessarily
imply abandoning it with respect to the causation of physical injuries. And the formidable
problem of measuring money damages in the rare case when the plaintiff cannot testify that,
fully informed, he would have demanded alternate treatment, requires further analysis.
Id. (emphasis added). In J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984), the
issue of damages apparently was not even worthy of mention.
50. Professors Waltz and Scheunemann, early advocates of abandoning the professional stan-
dard of informed consent, were also the first to propound the "reasonable person in the patient's
position" test for causation. Waltz & Scheunemann, supra note 20, at 646-49. They assume that the
proper damages are those personal injury damages caused by the doctor's failure to provide the
requisite information-damage occurring from the undisclosed risk. They would further reduce the
damages by "the difference between... [the patient's] condition with no treatment and his condition
after the undisclosed risk materialized." Id. at 649. The Waltz and Scheunemann position is
sharply criticized by Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 419-20 n.194, 422 n.202 (1974). Although Capron advocates recognition of
a cause of action for the invasion of the dignitary interest without harm, whether he would impose
any causation restraints on personal injury is not clear.
Professor Riskin does address the ramifications of adopting the autonomist position, which
seeks to protect the pure dignitary interest. He makes three proposals to address the causation
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After all, if a failure to disclose violates the interest of autonomous
choice, the damage to that interest is the same regardless of the success
or failure of the medical procedure which followed the uninformed
choice. Yet Shultz, for example, in her discussion of damages, takes the
position that if the medical procedure with undisclosed risks is success-
ful, damages are only nominal.5" If, on the other hand, the medical pro-
cedure fails, she would presume causation from the unreasonable failure
to disclose52 and award damages for the harm caused by the failure.5
3
Thus, by Shultz's analysis, the value of the interest in autonomy is, by.
itself, quite small. Only when violation of that interest is coupled with
the consequential damages of a failed medical procedure is the patient
entitled to a meaningful recovery capable of deterring violation of the
interest that Schultz so strongly supports.
On close analysis, then, the autonomist critique, though valuable,
creates a doctrine which depends for its vigor on a presumed causal con-
nection between nondisclosure of risks and a patient's decision to pro-
ceed. Just as with Canterbury and other negligence-based informed
consent cases, however, the credibility of this causal link is low.
B. Products Liability Informed Consent
0
Unlike the law of medical informed consent, in which courts have
worked out the doctrinal nuances, the parallel doctrine of informed
choice in products liability is still relatively primitive. Nonetheless, even
at these early stages of development, the products liability cases evidence
the same ambivalence concerning causation which characterizes the
medical cases.
At the outset, distinguishing two categories of failure-to-warn prod-
problem. His first suggestion is to abolish decision causation and fully compensate the plaintiff for
undisclosed risks which actually materialize. Riskin recognizes that this solution does not address
the case in which the doctor failed to disclose alternative therapies. Riskin, supra note 15, at 602
n. 124. The courts have, to date, refused to eliminate decision causation from informed consent
litigation. Cf supra text accompanying notes 21-30. Riskin's second suggestion is to shift the bur-
den of proof of causation to the defendant. Riskin, supra note 15, at 604-06. His third suggestion is
for a system of noninsurable fines to protect the dignitary rights of patients. Id. at 606-08. The
Riskin article demonstrates the ambivalence that pervades the work of the autonomists. Once they
have identified the shortcomings of the "but for" rule which governs decision causation, they cannot
provide a viable alternative to resolve the problem.
51. Shultz, supra note 8, at 290-91. Shultz does suggest that a court might allow for general
damages by analogy to invasion of privacy actions. Id. at 291 n.313. But, it is clear from her discus-
sion that, for the informed consent action to yield substantial damages, the focus must be on tangible
physical injury.
52. Id. at 251, 262.
53. Apparently, Shultz would start with the materialized damage from the undisclosed risk or
the bad outcome as the baseline for damages. She would then discount these damages, taking into
account a proportional finding on both decision and injury causation. Thus, she advocates a proba-
bilistic estimate as to whether the plaintiff would have chosen an alternative form of treatment. Id.
at 251, 287-88. She also recognizes that it is necessary to make another probabilistic estimate-i.e.,
what would have happened had a different choice been put into effect? Id. at 251, 289. The thesis of
this article is that the decision causation issue is nonjusticiable and cannot be saved by attempts to
proportionalize it.
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ucts liability cases is useful. Both categories concern manufacturers' fail-
ures to warn users of risks associated with use of their products. The
most common failure-to-warn cases-"risk reduction" warning cases-
arise when the manufacturer has failed to warn the user of a danger from
foreseeable use of the product that the user can avoid by conforming to
the warning. Thus, for example, a warning on a can of lacquer that the
product is extremely flammable reduces the risk of fire if the user reads
the warning and extinguishes all sources of fire in the area of use.54 In
contrast, "informed choice" warning cases involve products that cannot
be rendered safer by warning the user of the risks of harm from use;55
one can only inform the user that an irreducible risk accompanies use of
the product. If so informed, the consumer is free to make an informed
choice about whether she wishes to use and obtain or to abstain and
forgo the benefits from using the product.
A manufacturer's failure to warn of a material risk of either sort is a
breach of duty. Of course, a manufacturer is not liable for a breach of
duty alone. Tort law generally requires that the breach of duty cause the
plaintiff's harm for the defendant to be liable. Causation has been a
troubling problem in both the risk reduction and informed choice warn-
ing cases. The difficulties attending litigation of the hypothetical "but
for" issue56 substantially increase here, because in determining how the
events would have played out if the defendant had provided a warning,
one must necessarily determine whether the user would have read the
warning, and in addition, whether the user would have responded to it
through alternative conduct.
The very early cases suggesting that failure-to-warn products liabil-
ity cases are subject to an informed choice analysis did not directly ac-
knowledge the decision causation problem. In Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc.," for example, the plaintiff, a thirty-nine-year-old
male, responded to a mass polio immunization campaign. Within thirty
days after taking the vaccine, the plaintiff contracted polio, ultimately
causing paralysis from the waist down. Davis sued Wyeth Laboratories,
the manufacturer of the vaccine, under negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability theories. Davis relied on the fact that, subsequent to
his immunization, the Surgeon General and a national association of
health officers issued reports suggesting a small but definite risk of con-
tracting polio from use of the vaccine. The risk was remote-in the
range of less than one case for every one million doses. On the other
hand, the Surgeon General calculated the risk of contracting polio with-
out taking the vaccine for persons over the age of twenty to be somewhat
54. See e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976); Powell v. Standard
Brands Paint Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1985).
55. See cases cited infra note 60.
56. See Green, The Causal Relation in Negligence Law, 60 MicH. L. REV. 543 (1962); Hender-
son, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 913-14, 921-22 (1982).
57. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
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less than one in a million as well. Therefore, the Surgeon General recom-
mended that Type III oral vaccine be administered primarily to pre-
school and school age children, and that the vaccine be used for adults
"only with the full recognition of its very small risk.""8
In a perceptive decision, Judge Merrill, speaking for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, noted that the case raised very special problems, since identifying in
advance those adults who may be affected adversely by taking Type III
Sabin vaccine was impossible. He said:
In such cases, then, the drug is fit and its danger is reasonable
only if the balance is struck in favor of its use. Where the risk is
otherwise known to the consumer, no problem is presented, since
choice is available. Where not known, however, the drug can prop-
erly be marketed only in such fashion as to permit the striking of the
balance; that is, by full disclosure of the existence and extent of the
risk involved.
• .. [H]uman experimentation is essential with new drugs if
essential knowledge ever is to be gained. No person, however,
should be obliged to submit himself to such experimentation. If he
is to submit it must be by his voluntary and informed choice or a
choice made on his behalf by his physician.59
The court correctly recognized that focusing on consumer choice as the
fundamental value protected by a warning should determine liability.'
58. Id. at 124 (quoting an unidentified report of the Surgeon General).
59. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
60. The role of informed choice in products liability litigation has been widely recognized. See
Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask.- Restructuring Assumption of the Risk in the Products Liability
Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43-48 (1974) and authorities cited supra note 2. Considerable judicial
authority identifies informed choice as a separate ground for a product liability action. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37
Colo. App. 375, 380, 549 P.2d 1099, 1110 (Ct. App. 1976); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chap-
man, 180 Ind. App. 33, 55, 388 N.E.2d 541, 555 n.II (Ct. App. 1979). Many cases cite the language
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) which provides:
k Unavoidably unsafe products There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for
the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoida-
ble high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompa-
nied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps
even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of
the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with
the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Courts often cite to comment k when the warning would have permitted a doctor to reduce the
risk either (1) by pre-identifying plaintiff as particularly susceptible to adverse reaction or (2) by
early identification of adverse reaction permitting early treatment or discontinuance of the drug.
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The court did not appreciate, though, that decision causation was an is-
sue that required resolution.
Later cases, however, confronted the decision causation issue and
have articulated a principled position. In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,6
a father brought suit on behalf of his eight-month-old daughter who con-
tracted polio after being injected with the Sabin live-virus vaccine. The
parent contended that Wyeth failed to provide information about the risk
of contracting polio from the vaccine. The court concluded that such a
warning was necessary and then turned its attention to the decision cau-
sation issue. Relying on Texas case law,62 the Fifth Circuit held that
"where a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reason-
ably foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a
rebuttable presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any
warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the
risks."63 In a subsequent polio vaccine case, Cunningham v. Charles Pfi-
zer & Co.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court endorsed the view that a re-
buttable presumption was appropriate when a defendant failed to warn of
a risk. That court opined that in future cases the Canterbury objective
test for decision causation would govern: "[I]n light of all circumstances
existing on the date plaintiff took the vaccine, would a reasonably pru-
See, e.g., Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981); McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 552 (1974).
61. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
62. Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972) was the first case to suggest a
formal presumption in favor of causation in the case of an inadequate warning. The case involved
the manufacturer's failure to provide a risk reduction warning on a can of Freon that an explosion
could result if the Freon can were connected to the high rather than low compression side of an air
conditioning unit. The court suggested that the manufacturer could rebut the causation presump-
tion by producing evidence "that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the use,
irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstance tending to show that the improper
use was or would have been made regardless of the warning." Id. at 606.
63. 498 F.2d at 1281. The court misspoke in suggesting that a consumer who had been ade-
quately warned could have acted to "minimize the risks." Id. Knowing in advance which persons
were likely to contract polio from the Sabin vaccine was impossible. The full text of the decision
indicates at numerous points that the court well understood that this case was not one of risk reduc-
tion. See id. at 1274, 1276.
The court went on to find that the defendant had not introduced sufficient evidence on decision
causation to rebut the presumption:
Buttressing the presumption that Mrs. Reyes might have taken preventive steps is the testimony
of Reyes' expert, Dr. Ramiro Casson, that some pediatricians in Hidalgo County, at least by the
time of trial, had begun administering killed-virus vaccine to infants in order to build up their
level of antibodies before feeding them the live-virus drug. Tending to rebut the presumption
that Mrs. Reyes would have behaved differently had she been warned was the fact that she twice
returned to the Mission Clinic for further doses of vaccine, even after Anita contracted polio.
Yet it is patent from her testimony that Mrs. Reyes had not, even then, been informed of the
danger of the polio vaccine, and did not in fact understand what medication Anita was to
receive. The legal presumption suggested by the Technical Chemical opinion thus operates here
to provide the final element necessary to hold Wyeth Laboratories liable for Anita Reyes' polio-
myelitis.... According to the test we have distilled above, we must assume in the absence of
evidence to the contrary that Anita's parents would have acted on the warning, had it been
given. Perhaps this would have prevented her polio. It unquestionably would have avoided
Wyeth's liability.
1d. at 1282 (footnote omitted).
64. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
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dent person in plaintiff's position have refused the vaccine if adequate
warning of risks had been given."65
Despite these attempts to articulate a theory, the state of the law of
decision causation in products liability remains muddled. Though a re-
buttable presumption in favor of causation exists in numerous jurisdic-
tions,66 the kind of evidence which will suffice to rebut the presumption
is not clear. In most jurisdictions, decision causation remains a question
for the jury,6 7 and courts apparently will uphold an affirmative finding on
65. Id. at 1382. Although many other courts have identified the role of informed choice in
products litigation, see cases cited supra note 60, Cunningham apparently is the only case to suggest
the direct analogy to Canterbury and medical informed consent.
66. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37
Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1976); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind.
App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1979); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan.
387, 681 P.2d 1038, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839 (La. 1987);
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981); Cunningham v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974); Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.
1972).
67. See Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987) (whether presump-
tion of decision causation is rebutted in case of inadequate warnings to parent that DPT can cause
brain damage is fact question for jury); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33,
388 N.E.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1979) (whether presumption of decision causation is rebutted where physi-
cian was not adequately warned of risk of thrombophlebitis arising from oral contraceptive is jury
question); Holley v. Burrough Wellcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986) (whether doctor
relied on inadequate warning that anesthetic can cause malignant hypothermia is jury question). But
see Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 232 (1987) (no
evidence that physician would have warned patient of risk of contracting polio from vaccine, thus,
no proximate cause as a matter of law); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839 (La. 1987) (failure to
adequately warn in driver manual about intense heat emanating from catalytic converter was not the
cause of the fire because owner said he never read the manual-presumption of causation rebutted);
Mowery v. Crittendon Hosp., 155 Mich. App. 711, 400 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1986) (no evidence
that physician, with better warning of risk of retinal detachment from use of Phospholine Iodide,
would have decided against prescribing the drug).
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981), deals with the
issue of decision causation in a most interesting fashion. The claim against the drug company was
that it had failed to warn adequately of the higher risk of strokes associated with ingestion of Ovulen
by women with a prior medical history of toxemia during pregnancy. The jury found for the defend-
ant. The court recognized that the decision causation question is governed by a presumption in
favor of the plaintiff. It then evaluated the evidence to determine whether the presumption was
rebutted. The court found the jury's conclusion that plaintiff had not informed the obstetrician who
prescribed the Ovulen of her prior history of toxemia was supported by the record. Thus, the court
concluded that even if the warnings had been in the form suggested by the plaintiff, the doctor could
not have related the warnings to the plaintiff's condition. With regard to another aspect of decision
causation, the court took a markedly different approach. The obstetrician had testified that he knew
of the higher risk of strokes from Ovulen for women who had suffered from toxemia during preg-
nancy, and that he would not have been enlightened by an enhanced warning. The court categori-
cally rejected this argument saying:
We reject this contention. A warning may serve purposes other than merely filling gaps in the
intended recipient's knowledge-one may benefit from being warned or reminded of what he
already knows. Similarly, only speculations can support the assumption that an adequate warn-
ing, properly communicated, would not have influenced the course of conduct adopted by a
physician, even where the physician had previously received the information contained therein.
"What the doctor might or might not have done had he been adequately warned is not an
element plaintiff must prove as a part of her case." The evidence provided by [the doctor] as to
his independently acquired knowledge is insufficient to rebut the presumption ....
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very slender evidence.68 Obviously the decision causation issue, though
more muted than in the medical treatment context, 69 retains an impor-
tant role in the failure-to-warn products liability cases.
III. THE MYTH OF JUSTICIABLE CAUSATION
As already noted, an essential link in informed consent litigation, as
currently formulated, is a causal nexus between the doctor's failure to
provide appropriate information and the patient's decision to proceed
with the recommended procedure.70 The vitality of this personal injury
model for informed consent (in which the compensable harm is the in-
jury caused by the procedure) depends on the ability of courts to draw
that causal nexus realistically.
To make the causal connection, the patient must reconstruct the de-
cision-making process with such detail and precision that the fact finder
can determine what decision the patient would have made had the doctor
presented the additional increment of information. Thus, to fulfill this
task, a model of patient decision making is necessary. Indeed, inasmuch
as the inquiry will focus on the effect of additional information on a deci-
sion, what is really. needed is an understanding of human information
processing and its effect on patients' decisions.
Quite obviously, the appropriate model of information processing
and decision making depends on whether the applicable legal standard
for causation is subjective (focusing on this patient) or objective (focusing
on a reasonable patient).7" Regardless of the legal standard, however,
extensive psychological research into human decision making casts sig-
nificant doubt on our ability to create a credible model.
A number of factors make it difficult to predict how a person's deci-
sion would change as the amount of information provided to the person
increases. First, and foremost, most people do not process information in
a logical, predictable way. Rather, logical mistakes abound. Thus, how
a person will perceive the benefits and risks of a decision is unpredictable.
Id. at 201, 423 N.E.2d at 839 (footnote and citation omitted). See also Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo.
App. 375, 387, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107-10 (Ct. App. 1976).
68. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1976); Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981).
69. For an explanation of why decision causation plays a lesser role in products cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 136-40.
70. This following discussion focuses on the justiciability of causation in the medical informed
consent context. The outlined problems are also germane to the products liability informed choice
cases, although the products liability cases may raise causation problems that require a different
resolution by the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 136-40. For the most part, the products
liability informed choice cases are drug-related. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 60, 64, 66-67. The
causation question focuses on whether a doctor or a patient would have proceeded with the selfsame
drug therapy if in possession of additional information. Henceforth, we will most often refer to the
decision maker as the "patient," though in the products context, either the doctor who prescribes the
drug or the patient may be the actual decision maker. Similarly, we will refer to the party with the
duty to disclose information as the "doctor." When we speak in terms of "malpractice," the analo-
gous concept in the products cases is liability for an unreasonably dangerous product.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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Second, not only the information itself which is presented, but also the
manner in which the information is presented affects people's decisions.
Unless we know the manner in which the withheld information would
have been presented, we often cannot credibly predict its effect. Third,
the prior beliefs and information of the decision maker significantly affect
the impact of additional information on a decision; unless we completely
uncover the base on which the additional information would have stood,
we cannot determine the effect of the additional information. Any one of
these factors should make us doubt our power to determine what deci-
sion a person would have made if additional information had been
presented. In a milieu where a decision-making model seeks to deter-
mine whether the additional information would have caused the patient
to decline a reasonable procedure,72 the combined effect of all three fac-
tors leaves any such model little credibility. We must emphasize that
these factors are relevant to the causation issue not because they show
whether patient decisions are correct or incorrect. Rather, they are rele-
vant because they show that the legal system is unable to predict the
decisions which a patient's analysis of information will produce, whether
that analysis is logical or illogical.
A. Illogical Processing of Information
It is now clear that people simply do not make decisions in an objec-
tively rational way. More than two decades of research establishes that
people making decisions-whether laymen or scientists-consistently
make gross errors in evaluating objective information.73 These errors in
evaluation distort the meaning of the information which provides the ma-
trix for decision making. Of course, the decision one makes after evalu-
ating all relevant data will often reflect individual values; but
fundamental errors in logic are not the product of differing values. Two
plus two does not equal three in any value system. To the extent that
human decision makers process information in an illogical and unpre-
dictable way, a model which purports to tell us what decision a patient
would have made if provided with certain additional information is
suspect.
If the particular logical errors which people typically make were
limited to one aspect of human information processing, perhaps we could
isolate that aspect, guess what error would have been made, and try to
predict resulting decisions. Unfortunately, the loci of human errors are
72. Recommending an unreasonable procedure would itself be malpractice. See supra text ac-
companying note 35.73. Much of the work in this area is collected in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIS-
TICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY]. Studies of particular relevance to the concept of informed consent are expertly
gathered and discussed in Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. H. Much of the discussion in this paper about the
failure to process information logically is drawn from the Thompson article.
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not limited. Cognitive psychologists have identified numerous categories
of logical error in human information processing and decision making.
A few examples will suffice.
1. Underutilizing Base Rate Information
One of the more dramatic of such species of logical error flows from
our tendency to give disproportionate weight to an isolated, specific in-
stance or piece of information while giving insufficient weight to the un-
derlying milieu from which the specific instance or item of information
was drawn. This sort of error can result in significant misjudgment.
For example, imagine that during National Cancer Prevention
Week advertisements convinced a patient who had no reason to suspect
that he had cancer to take a diagnostic test for riboma, a usually fatal
form of cancer that is present in 5 out of every 1000 people. The diag-
nostic test is quite accurate: 95% of those with the cancer will test posi-
tive, while 95% of those without the cancer will test negative.7 4 If the
test yields a positive result, what are the chances that the patient has
cancer?
Most patients in this situation would believe it highly likely that
they have cancer. After all, the test is "95% accurate." Yet, upon close
analysis which takes into account the base rate of riboma, we can see,
counterintuitively, that the chances of cancer are relatively small."
The analysis requires only simple arithmetic. Imagine a population
of 20,000, all of whom take the diagnostic test. The base rate informa-
tion we have about riboma tells us that 5 out of every 1000 people suffer
from riboma. Thus, in a population of 20,000, we can expect that there
will be 100 people with riboma (and, of course, 19,900 people without it).
Our information about the diagnostic test tells us that 95% of those with
the cancer will test positive; thus, of the 100 riboma sufferers, 95 will
probably test positive, while 5 will test negative. Of the 19,900 people
without riboma, on the other hand, 95% , or 18,905, will test negative,
while 5%, or 995, will test positive. These calculations are summarized
in the following table:
74. To phrase it more technically, the test carries with it a 5% risk of Type I error (also known
as a "false positive"), because 5% of those who do not have cancer will test positive. Similarly, it
also carries a 5% risk of Type II error (also known as a "false negative"), because 5% of those with
the cancer will test negative. Of course, the risks of Type I error and Type II error need not be
equal, as they are in this hypothetical example. See generally Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and
Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987); Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 385 (1985).
75. For similar examples, see H. BURSZTAJN, R. FEINBLOOM, R. HAMM & A. BRODSKY,
MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDICAL CHANCES: How PATIENTS, FAMILIES, AND PHYSICIANS CAN COPE
WITH UNCERTAINTY 130-37 (1981); Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. H.
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CANCER NO CANCER TOTAL
TEST POSITIVE 95 995 1,090
TEST NEGATIVE 5 18,905 18,910
TOTAL 100 19,900 20,000
A brief glance at the table reveals a startling fact: although the
riboma test is "95% accurate," of the 1090 people who test positive, 995
do not have cancer. In other words, of those who test positive 91.28%
do not have cancer, while only 8.72% have cancer.76 This counterintui-
tive result springs from the too-easily-ignored base rate of riboma, which
is quite low. The test was not meaningless (before the test, our best infor-
mation would be that each person would have a 0.5% chance of having
riboma; after the test, a person who tests positive is known to have an
8.72% chance of having that cancer), yet its meaning is dramatically dif-
ferent than many patients presented with this information would initially
expect. 7
Quite obviously, failure to take into account base rate information
can have serious effects on medical decision making. If the only cure for
riboma were surgery with a 35% fatality rate, for example, a patient who
believed that he had a 95% chance of having riboma would be much
more likely to risk the surgery than a patient who believed he had an
8.72% chance of having the disease. To place this in the context of in-
formed consent, consider a situation in which a physician has told her
patient that he has tested positive for riboma, and that the test is 95%
accurate, but has not told him about the base rate of riboma. If the phy-
sician asks the patient for his consent to attempt the surgical cure for
riboma, the answer could easily be yes-after all, although the surgery is
risky, it appears quite likely that the patient has the fatal disease. What if
the doctor also told the patient about the base rate of riboma? If he
accurately combined the base rate information with the diagnostic test
results to conclude that he had only an 8.72% chance of having riboma,
he would probably decline the surgery. But would the patient be likely
to combine accurately the diagnostic and base rate information?
The answer to this question is probably not. As studies by Profes-
sors Kahneman and Tversky, among others, have conclusively demon-
strated, as soon as diagnostic information enters the picture, it almost
always overshadows base rate information.78 Indeed, not only the untu-
76. This result, of course, could be obtained more directly by use of Bayes' theorem. See gener-
ally T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACO'rr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOM-
ics 542 (2d ed. 1977).
77. Admittedly, in this textbook example we applied the Bayesian rule in a case where a pa-
tient without any symptoms underwent random testing. In the more typical situation, one will have
to adjust the probabilities to account for symptoms, duration of pain, family predisposition, and
other idiosyncratic factors. Nonetheless, the failure to account for base rate data can bring about
serious and often outrageous error in risk evaluation.
78. Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 237
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tored make this logical error; studies demonstrate that even supposedly
sophisticated scientists chronically undervalue base rate data.79
Thus, we obviously cannot assume that a patient with the base rate
data would decide differently than one without, even though, if both pa-
tients act logically, the information clearly might make a difference. The
assumption of logical information processing is empirically untenable. If
we cannot count on patients to make logical analyses of the facts
presented to them, on what basis can a fact finder determine the effect an
additional fact would have had on a patient's analysis of the situation,
and thus, on the subsequent decision?
If the only aspect of information processing that patients tend to
perform illogically concerned base rates, perhaps the legal system could
deal with the phenomenon. For one thing, part of the doctor's duty
could be to indicate the appropriate probabilities, after taking into ac-
count both base rate and diagnostic data. In the riboma case, for exam-
ple, the doctor's duty could be to report not merely that 5 people out of
1000 have the disease, and that the 95% accurate test was positive, but
also that the combined effect of these two pieces of information is that
the patient has only an 8.72% chance of having riboma.8°
Unfortunately, the misuse of base rate data is only one of many
problems that affect data processing by patients. The literature is replete
with examples of the high frequency of illogic in combining pieces of
information to reach conclusions. As these studies make clear, while the
rational analysis of data relevant to important decisions may be an aspi-
ration for all, it is not an accurate description of reality for many. The
cumulative effect of all of these types of processing errors makes it impos-
sible to frame a workable duty for the doctor or to predict and prove how
the patient would err.
2. Assessing Multiple Risks
Closely related to base rate problems are the difficulties patients face
in assessing multiple risks. In many cases, a medical procedure will pose
risks of several different adverse effects. If the adverse effects involved
are quite serious, a patient may make the decision whether to go ahead
with the procedure based on his estimate of the likelihood that none of
the adverse effects will occur. If the adverse effects are somewhat less
(1973); see also R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 157 (1980). But see Kruglanski, Friedland & Farkash, Lay Persons'Sensitivity to
Statistical Information: The Case of High Perceived Applicability, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 503 (1987).
79. See sources cited infra note 80.
80. Of course, this enhanced duty would require the physician to calculate the probabilities
correctly, a task which would prove difficult for many physicians. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note
73, ch. 1, at 18 ("Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases .... "); see also Detsky,
Editorial, Decision Analysis: What's the Prognosis?, 106 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 321 (1987); Sox,
Editorial, Decision Analysis: A Basic Clinical Skill?, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 271 (1987).
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serious, on the other hand, the patient may base the decision on his esti-
mate of the likelihood that no more than a certain number of the poten-
tial adverse effects will occur. Even if the doctor provides the patient
complete and accurate information as to the risks of each of the individ-
ual potential adverse effects, however, the patient is unlikely to combine
those pieces of information correctly to determine the combined
probabilities on which he will base his decision.
For example, assume that a doctor recommends a particular surgi-
cal procedure to her seriously ill patient. As part of the recommenda-
tion, she tells the patient that there is a 20% chance of a fatal cardiac
arrest during the operation and a 30% chance that the operation will
cause irreversible neurological damage. Quite understandably, the pa-
tient would like neither of these outcomes to occur; thus, he will base his
decision on the probability that either cardiac arrest or neurological dam-
age will occur. If that probability is too high, he will decline the opera-
tion. If the two risks are independent, the chance of either occurring is
44%.81
Alternatively, imagine a procedure for which the known risks are
partial memory loss (20% chance) and migraine headaches (30%
chance). The patient is willing to suffer one of those hardships, but not
both. The probability of concern to this patient, then, is the probability
that both risks will occur. If the risks are independent, this probability is
6%.82
How many patients would correctly assess these probabilities? Re-
search indicates that people typically underestimate disjunctive (A or B)
probabilities and overestimate conjunctive (A and B) probabilities.8 3
81. The probability of either risk occurring equals one minus the probability that neither risk
will occur. The probability that neither risk will occur is equal to the product of the probability that
the first risk will not occur and the probability that the second risk will not occur. The probability
that the first risk will not occur is 0.8 (1.0 - 0.2), and the probability that the second risk will not
occur is 0.7 (1.0 - 0.3). The product of these probabilities is 0.56. Therefore, the probability that
either risk will occur is 1.00 - 0.56, or 0.44 (or 44%).
Symbolically:
P(A or B) = I - P(not-A and not-B)
P(not-A and not-B) = P(not-A) X P(not-B)
P(not-A) = 1- P(A)
P(not-B) = 1- P(B)
P(A) = 0.2
P(B) = 0.3
Therefore,
P(A or B) = 1 -(0.8 X 0.7)
= I - 0.56
= 0.44 = 44%
82. P(A and B) = P(A) X P(B).
83. See Pitz, Sensitivity of Direct and Derived Judgments to Probabilistic Information, 65 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 164 (1980); Tversky & Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:
The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement, 90 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 293 (1983). Moreover,
combining multiple probabilities is easy only when the multiple risks are independent of one another.
This is rarely the case. And when risks are related, any lack of data on the extent to which they are
related makes it impossible to accurately assess the combined risks.
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Given the narrow range of cases in which informed consent doctrine is
meaningful,84 the possibility of even a relatively small miscalculation
casts in doubt the imaginary, reconstructed causal chain. In these multi-
ple risk cases, the likelihood of inaccurately reconstructing the patient's
decision is high. The fact finder must first determine whether the pa-
tient's decision would have depended on his assessment of the likelihood
of all risks occurring, or only one of them. The fact finder must then
speculate as to the results of the patient's assessment (error-ridden or
not).85
3. Availability
Still another common species of information processing with ques-
tionable rationality and, therefore, uncertain predictability, relates to the
tendency of many people to give excessive weight to easily accessible and
memorable examples of a particular phenomenon, while giving too little
weight to drier collections of data. Bertrand Russell recognized this over
six decades ago when he observed that "popular induction depends upon
the emotional interest of the instances, not upon their number."86 An
example of this phenomenon is provided by Thompson:
Imagine, for example, that you are suffering from a stomach ulcer
and your doctor suggests you have surgery to have it removed. The
doctor mentions that there is a 5% chance that complications will
develop, necessitating further surgery, but that in 95% of the cases a
single operation is sufficient. Beyond that, the operation poses only
the usual risks associated with general anesthesia and abdominal
surgery, which are quite small. Having decided to have the surgery,
you mention your intention to an acquaintance who says: "Oh my
God. Don't do it. They performed that operation on my Uncle
Harry; it was the beginning of the end. Soon as they took out one
ulcer another popped up, then another. Pretty soon they had taken
out most of his stomach and a good part of his intestines. Then he
started hemorrhaging. It was awful. Poor old Harry. Maybe if he
had just lived with the damn ulcer he'd still be alive today."87
The vividness of this additional information should not cause it to be
given disproportionate importance. In the example just cited, Uncle
Harry's unfortunate experience should have little effect on the decision.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
85. Should the doctor's duty also encompass soliciting decision criteria from the patient and
aiding him in combining multiple probabilities? While this may be a worthy aspirational standard,
tort law does not typically make rules of conduct out of such unmanageable aspirations. See gener-
ally Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as
a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908).
86. B. RUSSELL, PHILOSOPHY 269 (1927), quoted in Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, Popu-
lar Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supra note 73, ch. 7, at 112.
87. Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS, supra note 8, app. H, at 92.
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Assuming his case was not included among the 5% of cases with compli-
cations which the doctor mentioned, the friend's story should cause the
estimated likelihood of complications to be revised upward by only a mi-
nuscule amount. Before learning about this case, the estimate of the like-
lihood of complications was 5%. If that 5% estimate was based on
10,000 cases, learning about one additional case should cause a revision
upward to only 5.01%. Yet, research on the availability heuristic tells us
that this one additional case would probably have considerably greater
influence on most people's subjective assessments. 88
Several theories attempt to explain why people overvalue specific ex-
amples. 9 But why this species of illogic exists is less important for our
purposes than the fact that it does exist. This logical flaw can influence
the hypothetical decision causation analysis in two ways. If omitted in-
formation in an informed consent case was in the nature of summary
statistics gleaned from a large number of cases, the fact finder can never
be sure that the patient would have taken this information into account
appropriately; a patient who also knew of one or more specific example
of the "Uncle Harry" sort might well have discounted the summary
data.90 If, on the other hand, the omitted item of information was a
specific memorable example, the fact finder can never be sure that the
patient would have given the information its logically appropriate
weight; it is likely, as these studies suggest, that the patient would over-
value the information.
The effect of the prevalence of illogical analysis is critical to the doc-
trine of informed consent.9 After all, the decision causation question in
88. See, e.g., R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 78, at 73-89; Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in
the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 105 (1971); see also R. COOTER & T. ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 416-17 (1988); Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6
RISK ANALYSIS 403, 404-05 (1986).
89. See R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 78, at 36-41, 43-59.
90. The effect of this phenomenon can be even more insidious. Not only may the patient have
an Uncle Harry, but the doctor may well be more likely to tell the patient about specific examples.
After all, the doctor's choice of information to transmit to the patient may also be influenced by the
availability heuristic. Thus, specific idiosyncratic examples may more readily come to her mind than
duller empirical data.
91. Some commentators have suggested that the decision-making processes described in this
section, although appearing irrational, actually reflect "alternative rationalities." See, e.g., March,
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978). For a
discussion of these commentators' theories, see Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to
Adjust Long Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 540-46 (1985). We take no position on this
debate. For our purposes, the important point is that decision making is subject to broad variation
as a result of these phenomena, whether labeled rational or not. The unpredictability, not the logic,
is of concern here.
Decision theory literature continues to investigate the way information is processed in a variety
of circumstances. None of the recent studies challenge the thesis that the decision heuristics set
forth herein simply render the decision causation issue too speculative for litigation. Viscusi, Magot
& Huber, Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An Empirical Evaluation of Hazard
Warnings, 17 RAND J. EON. 351 (1986), concludes that the extent to which consumers take precau-
tions is consistent with the level of risk indicated on a label, the amount of risk information, the
specificity of the risk and the precaution indicated, and the economic benefits of safety precautions.
This study, aimed at testing the efficiency of warning labels for cleaning and drain-opening agents,
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informed consent cases is, essentially, "What would the patient have
done if presented with the unpresented information?" If we cannot even
tell whether the patient would have correctly incorporated the additional
information into implicit probabilistic judgments concerning the deci-
sion, how can we confidently state what decision the patient would have
made based on that judgment?92
B. Manner of Presentation
As we have seen, the legal system's ability to reconstruct accurately
the patient's decision-making process which would have occurred had
the doctor presented additional information is frustrated by patients' fre-
quent inability to incorporate such information in a predictable manner.
Further, not only what information is presented, but the manner in
which it is presented, has a dramatic effect on decisions.9 The following
examples illustrate two versions of this phenomenon.
1. Framing Effects
Everyone knows that "half-empty" and "half-full" have different
connotations. Similarly, in many circumstances, descriptions of the risks
of a medical procedure in terms of the chances of success or the chances
of failure may have different connotations and lead to different decisions.
For example, consider the following problems presented to two
groups of subjects by Professors Kahneman and Tversky.94 In the first
problem, seventy subjects were told that, in addition to whatever they
own, they have been presented with $1000. The subjects were then asked
to choose between (a) a 50% chance of an additional $1000, and (b) a
100% chance of an additional $500. In the second problem, sixty-eight
subjects were told that, in addition to whatever they own, they have been
presented with $2000; they were then asked to choose between (a) a 50%
chance of losing $1000, and (b) a 100% chance of losing $500.
concludes that consumers process risk information consistent with the main predictions of an eco-
nomic model of rational behavior. The conclusions have no relevance to our thesis since hazard
warnings are clearly risk reduction warnings in which the appropriate consumer behavior is clear.
The very essence of the informed choice context, by contrast, is that no correct choice exists. See
supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
In an interesting study, the author questions the applicability of the findings of Kahneman &
Tversky and others concerning irrationality of individual decision makers to market decisions pro-
duced by the concurrent and repeated decisions of many actors. Camerer, Do Biases in Probability
Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 981 (1987). While inter-
esting, this study is also inapposite. Decision making in the informed choice context is a solitary,
one-time-only process bearing little relationship to repeated, collective choice.
92. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 417 (1988).
93. See generally Silva & Sorrell, Enhancing Comprehension of Information for Informed Con-
sent: A Review of Empirical Research, IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, Jan.-
Feb. 1988, at 1, 3-4.
94. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 273 (1979); see also Quattrone & Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psycholog-
ical Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 719 (1988).
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A moment's reflection will reveal that the two problems are identi-
cal. In both problems, the subjects were asked to choose between (a) a
gamble in which they had an even chance of ending up with either $1000
or $2000, and (b) a sure $1500. Yet the preferences expressed by the two
groups of subjects were far from identical. In the first problem, 84% of
the subjects selected the sure $1500 ($500 in addition to the original
$1000); 16% chose the gamble. In the second problem, however, only
31% chose the sure $1500 ($2000 minus $500); 69% chose the gamble. 95
Professors Kahneman and Tversky theorize that the explanation for
the disparity between the two groups of subjects is that "people normally
perceive outcomes as gains or losses, rather than as final states of wealth
or welfare."' 96 Quite obviously, then, whether the risks of a medical pro-
cedure are framed as gains or losses could have a significant impact on
the patient's choice.
An example of the framing phenomenon in the medical decision-
making context is provided in a study by Professors McNeil, Pauker,
Sox, and Tversky. 97 The researchers asked subjects to imagine that they
had lung cancer and to choose between surgery and radiation treatment
based on the information presented to them. Identical outcomes were
framed differently for different subjects: they told some subjects the
range of possible outcomes in terms of the probability of living at various
points (e.g., 68% chance of living for more than one year), while they
told others the range of possible outcomes in terms of the probability of
dying (e.g., 32% chance of dying by the end of one year).98
The framing of the various results in terms of survival or mortality
had a significant impact. On the average, subjects preferred radiation
therapy to surgery 42% of the time when the information was presented
in terms of the probability of dying, but only 25% of the time when
information was presented in terms of the probability of living.99 One
can easily imagine similar examples where the outcomes of alternative
treatment options could be framed in terms of either success or failure.
The empirical evidence indicates that framing would probably affect the
decision. Thus, to hypothesize what decision a patient would have made
if provided with additional information-as we must if we are to deter-
mine decision causation-is highly conjectural unless we are sure how
the information would have been framed. Attempting to cure this prob-
95. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 94, at 273.
96. Id. at 274; see also Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,
59 J. Bus. S251 (1986).
97. McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies,
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982) [hereinafter McNeil]; Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
98. The researchers also studied the effects of two other differences in the way alternative treat-
ments were presented-whether the information was presented in terms of life expectancy or cumu-
lative probability of living or dying, and whether the alternative treatments were identified or not.
McNeil, supra note 97, at 1259-60.
99. Id. at 1261.
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lem by imposing upon doctors a duty to present information only in a
positive or negative way would, of course, be absurd.
2. Anchoring and Primacy
Closely related to framing effects in decision making are the effects
flowing from the order of information processing by the decision maker.
The route one follows from an initial belief through the forest of addi-
tional information depends on one's starting point and the sequence in
which the information is received.
That the order in which information is received has an effect on
decision making is not surprising. From kindergarten to first date to ini-
tial job interview, we are constantly cautioned to "put your best foot
forward" and "make a good impression." That we believe this folk wis-
dom is borne out by simple observation. Children's faces, for example,
are never quite as clean as they are on the first day of school. Similarly,
one need not be clairvoyant to determine which days interviewers are
present at a law school; the normally relaxed student attire gives way to
the formal dress code of Wall Street.
This widespread belief in the importance of first impressions has
been confirmed by psychological research. A decision maker responds to
the data before him in a sequential fashion; it is eaten and digested piece-
meal. The taste left by the first bite affects the perception of the entire
meal. Two related sets of observations about cognitive analysis will illus-
trate this.
a. Anchoring
People tend to make estimates by starting from an initial value that
is adjusted as a result of the receipt of subsequent information to reach a
final estimate." 0 One's final estimate of a quantity depends significantly
on the initial information presented, because adjustments from that start-
ing point tend to be insufficient.10' "That is, different starting points
yield different estimates which are biased toward the initial values."'0 2
This concept is known as "anchoring."
Kahneman and Tversky have presented two well-known examples
of this phenomenon. '° In the first, subjects were asked to estimate vari-
ous quantities (such as the percentage of African nations in the United
100. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JuDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 73, ch. 1, at 14. Indeed, Bayes' theorem is itself a theoreti-
cal statement of how probability estimates should be adjusted on the basis of new information. See,
e.g., T. WONNACOIr & R. WONNACOTT, supra note 76, at 542.
101. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 73, ch. 1, at 14; see also Einhorn & Hogarth, Ambiguity and
Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 433, 436-39 (1985).
102. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JuDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 73, ch. 1, at 14.
103. Id. at 14-15.
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Nations) in terms of percentages. However, the estimate was made in an
unusual manner. First, a wheel of fortune with the numbers zero to one
hundred was spun in the subject's presence to select a number. Second,
the subject was asked whether the number chosen by the wheel of fortune
was lower or higher than the percentage to be estimated. Third, the sub-
ject gave a numerical estimate of the quantity in question. The anchoring
effect was clear: the subjects' estimates depended heavily on the number
selected by the wheel of fortune. For example, the median estimate of
the percentage of African nations in the United Nations was 25% for
subjects that received 10% as the starting point, but 45% for groups that
received 65% as the starting point.1°4
In their second example,"°5 Kahneman and Tversky asked two
groups of high school students to estimate, within five seconds, the value
of a numerical expression written on the blackboard. One group esti-
mated the value of:
8X7X6X5X4X3X2X 1,
while the other group estimated the value of:
1X2X3X4X5X6X7X8.
Both products are, of course, the same. Yet the median estimate for the
first sequence was 2250, while the median estimate for the second se-
quence was 512." °6 Clearly, the initial numbers influenced the estimate;
those subjects whose sequences began with low numbers made lower esti-
mates than those whose sequences began with higher numbers.
b. Primacy
Closely related to anchoring is the so-called primacy effect. Solo-
mon Asch provides a good example of this effect. '07 Asch presented sub-
jects with a series of adjectives describing a hypothetical person and then
asked the subjects to evaluate the person. The adjectives were "intelli-
gent," "industrious," "impulsive, .... critical," "stubborn," and "envi-
ous." He gave some subjects the favorable adjectives first, while he gave
others the unfavorable adjectives first. The hypothetical person was eval-
uated more positively by subjects who were first given the favorable ad-
jectives than by those given the unfavorable adjectives first. While
scholars disagree over the psychological mechanism accounting for this
effect,10 8 the conclusion that, in forming impressions, early information
predominates over later information is not subject to serious question.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. The correct answer is 40,320.
107. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 258-90
(1946).
108. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 78, at 173-74.
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Indeed, the primacy effect is so powerful that it demonstrably survives
not only the introduction of new evidence, but also the total discrediting
of the information forming the basis of the initial reaction.
The potential effects of the anchoring and primacy phenomena in
medical decision making are obvious. A patient who is first told the ben-
efits of a proposed procedure and then told its risks is likely to have a
more positive response to that procedure than one who is first told the
risks and then the benefits. There is a big difference in perception be-
tween "Joe, there's an operation that can cure you completely-of
course, it carries serious risks .... " and "Joe, I am recommending to you
a very risky operation, but if it succeeds you'll be completely cured. .... "
The impact of the primacy effect is that, in trying to determine the
likely effect of missing risk information on a decision about a recom-
mended procedure, knowing whether that information would have been
presented before or after the benefits of the procedure is critical. Can it
seriously be claimed that the legal system can not only determine what
effect information would have on a patient's decision, but also in what
order a physician would have presented the information?
Given the framing, anchoring, and primacy effects, the hypothetical
decision reconstruction required by current informed consent doctrine
even more clearly is revealed as based on unsupportable inference. Not
only must the fact finder hypothetically assess and reconstruct the pa-
tient's logic and rationality in processing the missing information, the
fact finder must also hypothesize the manner in which the information
would, have been presented. The manner in which the information
would have been presented is extremely important,'" 9 yet inherently
unknowable.
Thus, unless the law is prepared to address not only what informa-
tion the doctor must disclose, but also how and in what manner the in-
formation is disclosed, the law cannot honestly answer the decision
causation question. An honest answer requires either an unlikely finding
109. The role of information sequencing is important not only with regard to the impact that
prior information has on the decision maker, but also because it may cause varying degrees of com-
mitment to a particular decision. The role of commitment as a decision heuristic is thoroughly
explored in I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT,
CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 279-308 (1977). One form of partial commitment has been dubbed the
"foot-in-the-door" technique. For example, a doctor may encourage a patient to make a particular
decision by acquiring the patient's consent on a series of minor decisions which are preparation for
the desired final decision. The small preparatory decisions, in and of themselves, do not formally
commit the patient to a final decision, but psychologically, the patient becomes committed to the
particular course of action. Blood tests, X rays, or other sophisticated and expensive diagnostic tests
(e.g., CAT scans or angiograms) may cause partial commitments to a surgical procedure. Informa-
tion the patient receives after such partial commitments have been made is likely to be far less potent
than information received at an earlier stage of decision making. See id. at 291-95; Freedman &
Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-In-The-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 195 (1966); Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. H, at 104-05, 113.
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of how the doctor would have disclosed the omitted information or im-
posing an impractical duty to disclose in a particular manner.
C. The Effect of Prior Idiosyncratic Information
The above analyses of human decision making reveal many in-
stances in which the patient's prior experiences and knowledge will likely
affect his decision significantly. Even if the patient makes decisions in a
perfectly logical manner (unlikely though that may be), the final
probabilities he calculates for the risks involved in a particular procedure
will depend, at least in part, on the information he had previously. 10
Thus, a sensitive determination of the decision this precise patient would
have made had the missing information been provided would require a
careful analysis of the bits of information that were lurking in the re-
cesses of his mind. The litigation process is not likely to excel at this
analysis.
Moreover, patients routinely devalue quite probative, but dry, col-
lective information, such as base rates, in favor of less probative, but
more memorable, anecdotes. This increases the importance of uncover-
ing those anecdotes in determining how a patient would have decided.
Does the patient have an Uncle Harry who faced a similar decision? Has
the patient faced a similar decision before? Did the patient see a memo-
rable motion picture about the disease? The patient's base of information
and impressions is of critical importance in making his decisions-logi-
cally or illogically.
D. The Psychiatric Dimension
The justiciability of the causation issue is further compromised by
the inability of courts to account for a broad range of psychiatric factors
which help shape decision making. In his important work, The Silent
World of Doctor and Patient, Professor Jay Katz argues that a significant
impediment to autonomous decision making is the failure of doctor and
patient to account for subtle but powerful influences that affect their in-
teraction."' Katz notes that, early in his work with patients, Freud ob-
served the development of an "intense emotional relationship between
the patient and analyst which [cannot] be accounted for by the actual
situation." '12 Freud labelled this phenomenon "transference," meaning
that patients have a decided proclivity to "endow their analyst with
many of the characteristics of their earliest caretakers rather than to view
the analyst solely as who he is.""' 3
110. Final probabilities are determined by combining prior information (and the concomitant
probabilities) with new information. See generally T. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOTT, supra note
76, at 542.
111. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT chs. V-VI (1984).
112. Id. at 142 (quoting from S. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, in 20 STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 42 (1959)).
113. Id.
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Katz believes that the implications of the transference phenomenon
for informed consent are profound. Transference feelings, he argues,
"become more intense when persons are ill and beset by fear and anxie-
ties." ' 4 Regression to infantile hopes and fears are a common response
to such stress, and thus, opens the patient to viewing the doctor as par-
ent-caretaker rather than merely as healer." 5 Unless patients are forced
to recognize and confront transference, they are prone to unwarranted
acceptance of the doctor's recommended decisions. Katz cautions physi-
cians to help patients deal with them in a more realistic fashion. Yet, he
admits that "[t]ransference manifestations ... cannot be eliminated; they
can only be attenuated."' 1 6
Transference is, of course, only one of a multitude of interpersonal
psychological factors which give content to the complex doctor-patient
relationship." 7 The presence of such complex factors adds to our con-
siderable doubt about the justiciability of the decision causation issue.
As noted earlier, this issue requires a fact finder to determine whether the
patient would have agreed to the therapeutic intervention had he been
given the additional information which the law demands. If the special
relationship between doctor and patient profoundly influences whether
the patient imbues the doctor's recommendation with significance well
above its objective content, then the decision causation question is even
further compromised.
It is not only possible, but quite probable, that additional informa-
tion would have been nondeterminative as to patient choice. If transfer-
ence cannot be eliminated, then we must now add it to our list of decision
heuristics." 8 To litigate decision causation without facing the psycho-
114. Id. at 143.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 145.
117. Id. at 114-21. Others have described how decision makers in high conflict situations en-
gage in defensive avoidance of information which will interfere with a tentative decision. I. JANIS &
L. MANN, supra note 109, at 83-84, 205. The authors further note that when faced with such high
conflict decisions, the decision maker exhibits a significant tendency to shift responsibility to other
decision makers (herein the physician). Id. at 87, 205. The sharper the conflict, the greater the
likelihood the patient will resolve the tension by shifting responsibility as a means of dealing with the
tensions.
118. This discussion presumes that courts would be prepared to impose a duty on a physician to
reduce the transference phenomenon and transform patients into more responsible choice makers.
Katz asserts that a physician must take the initiative in addressing this problem:
Physicians need to appreciate that they are not only the victims of these transferences but
also their abettors. Because they have been as blind to the existence of transference as their
patients, doctors have encouraged and augmented patients' transference feelings by unwittingly
promising more than they can deliver or by not confronting their patients' explicit and implicit
unrealistic expectations. A greater awareness by both parties of the power of transference and
the obligation to contain its power are essential preconditions for conversation. Initially, this
obligation must be assumed by professionals rather than by their patients. Patients can only
learn of the power of transference over time and through personal experiences with aware phy-
sicians who educate them about its manifestations.
The phenomenon of transference reinforces the need for formulating a concept of auton-
omy that takes human psychology into account. Patients' confusion between past and present,
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logical realities appears outright dishonest. To include them would turn
the courtroom into a theatre for the exploration of the role of nonquan-
tifiable psychological factors in human decision making.
E. Litigating Decision Causation
The impact of these observations is enormous. Unquestionably, the
legal system's insistence on determining the hypothetical results of a hy-
pothetical decision-making process incorporates so much uncertainty
that its credibility is minimal. Accordingly, determinations about deci-
sion causation in the informed choice arena can only be made by blinding
ourselves to the complexities inherent in the process. The uncertainties
are so great, and the margin for error so small, that any judgment, either
way, cannot be made with any confidence."1 9 Judgments that inherently
lack credibility cannot convey their desired message to society in general
nor to those to whom they are directed in particular.' 20
Each of the decision heuristics described above, acting separately,
would significantly undermine the credibility of decision causation deter-
minations. Acting in combination, the impact is devastating.
21
present and past, parental figures and doctors, and doctors and parental figures affects autono-
mous functioning in significant ways .... Doctors must learn to distinguish themselves with
greater deliberateness from parental imagoes who, in time distant, often had to issue commands
rather than explanations. To so distinguish themselves, doctors must learn to acknowledge
their limitations and the limitations of medicine, to be sensitive to any emergence of magical
expectations in their patients, and to try to correct such expectations by explaining what an
intervention can and cannot accomplish. In short, doctors must address the irrational and un-
conscious expectations of patients that inform the choice-making process. Such efforts will not
always meet with success and, indeed, can never be totally successful. However hard one tries
to be true to Rousseau's aphorism that "It is better to know one's chains than to deck them with
flowers," some chains that imprison the human mind inevitably remain decked with flowers.
J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 144-47 (1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting
from I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxix (1969)).
No court has recognized such a duty nor does Katz suggest that transference reduction be
recognized by the courts. We only suggest that even if a court were to recognize such a duty, it
would create causation and valuation problems that would be nonjusticiable.
119. See Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985). In these decisions, the confidence interval surrounding
the legal system's determination of the likelihood of decision causation will almost certainly straddle
50%, with the result that a decision either way is within the determination's margin of error. See id.
at 404; see also I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 109, at 204, 213; Einhorn & Hogarth, Decision
Making Under Ambiguity, 59 J. Bus. S225 (1986); Einhorn & Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty
in Probabilistic Inference, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 433 (1985).
120. Such legal decisions, even if they are accurate, are unacceptable and ought to be avoided.
See generally Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
Evidence about the success of the present regime in encouraging informed consent is difficult to
find. Recently, health care providers responded to a national questionnaire regarding informed con-
sent in administration of intravenous contrast-enhanced radiography. Results of the study are re-
ported by Spring & Aiken, Overcoming the Ambiguities of Informed Consent Doctrine, DIAGNOSTIC
IMAGING, Dec. 1985, at 44. The survey indicates that two-thirds of radiologists did not inform
patients of such major reactions as shock, cardiopulmonary compromise, and venal failure, even
though their reactions occurred with a frequency ranging from about one in one thousand to one in
three thousand. Broad disregard of the legal doctrine appears evident.
121. Courts are particularly ill-suited to resolve such highly "polycentric" problems. See gener-
ally Henderson, .supra note 4.
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The prevalence of irrational information processing is particularly
troubling. If the legal standard of decision causation is the subjective
(this patient) standard, the fact finder must determine how irrational this
patient is, or was, at processing medical information generally. More
specifically, the fact finder must determine the incremental effect of the
omitted information on the rational or irrational decision-making pro-
cess. Quite obviously, this inquiry into the effect of a piece of incremen-
tal information is of a sort which the legal system rarely attempts. As
demonstrated by the studies discussed above, the legal system has ques-
tionable competence for such an inquiry.
If the standard of decision causation is objective (reasonable pa-
tient), the problems are even more daunting. Clearly, the reasonable per-
son (at least if that mythical creature is modeled on actual, accepted
human behavior) is not an objectively "rational" decision maker. There-
fore, we cannot assume that the reasonable patient would have acted ra-
tionally. Yet, the irrationality that would attend a decision made by a
reasonable patient cannot easily be quantified or predicted. How would a
reasonable patient act? Reasonably irrationally? Unless this question
can be answered, the objective standard of causation lacks all
credibility. 122
Even if the legal system were to assume that patients would have
processed omitted information in a logically coherent manner (regardless
of whether such an assumption is justified), other heuristics, identified
above, make hypothetical reconstruction of the decision-making process
highly speculative. The manner of presentation is of critical importance
in determining what effect information would have had. Yet, any state-
ment of how the information would have been presented is simply guess-
work or supposition, unless the legal system is prepared to impose duties
122. The role of causation in tort law has been the subject of prolific debate in recent years. See,
e.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 69 (1975); Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 109 (1983); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Eco-
nomic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985); Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63
CHI. KENT L. REV. 397 (1987). The debate as to whether the tenacious hold of causation on the law
of torts is explainable utilizing efficiency criteria or depends on corrective justice notions is of consid-
erable importance, but is of marginal relevance to this article. The unadorned fact is that causation
remains a significant factor in the informed choice cases. If we are correct that the effect of multiple
decision heuristics renders any decision causation finding speculative, then whatever the underlying
theoretical justification for the role of causation, decision causation findings must fail in the informed
choice context because they lack inherent plausibility. Nor can decision causation be rescued by
passing it off as a policy-laden "fact." See, e.g., Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause"
in Negligence Law, Part I, Factual Uncertainty and Competitive Fairness, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 764,
777-93 (1964); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956). At the very
least, the policy approach requires some sense of the probabilities that the courts are granting recog-
nition. Furthermore, as Professor Wright has demonstrated, the various policy-oriented approaches
to cause-in-fact merely merge the cause-in-fact question with other policy questions, but do not
remove the difficult cause question from the picture. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1735, 1741-45 (1985). The narrow range of the informed choice cases and the multiple deci-
sion heuristics render the decision causation inquiry almost valueless.
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not only with respect to what information doctors must present to pa-
tients, but also how doctors must present that information.'23 Similarly,
unless we can expose the base on which the omitted information would
have rested, determination of its effect is clouded. Finally, the interper-
sonal dimension of the doctor-patient relationship not only has independ-
ent significance, but also affects the patient's evaluation of information.
One might be tempted to defend the current approach to litigating
decision causation in informed consent cases by observing that all fact
reconstruction is subject to uncertainty. After all, in addition to the
cases that courts can clearly resolve one way or the other, some cases will
always be too close to call. Usually, we do not allow the specter of the
uncertain cases to undermine the credibility of those that are clear. Yet,
the context of informed consent litigation is significantly different from
the prototypical lawsuit because the easy cases are filtered out before they
reach the decision causation issue.
In cases where the omitted information clearly would not have af-
fected the patient's (or a reasonable patient's) decision, the omitted infor-
mation usually will not meet the materiality requirement and, therefore,
the doctor did not violate a duty by failing to disclose it. On the other
extreme, in cases in which the omitted information clearly would have
led this patient (or a reasonable patient) to decline the recommended pro-
cedure, the doctor's recommendation of the procedure likely was mal-
practice. These filters screen out most of the easy cases before it is
necessary to resolve the decision causation issue. The bulk of cases in
which the decision causation issue is relevant, then, are the hard cases-
those in which the omitted information was material, but the recom-
mended procedure was reasonable. In these difficult cases, the tenuous,
speculative nature of decision reconstruction is an acute problem. 124
123. If the legal system were to take the unlikely step of mandating the manner and order of
presentation of relevant information, the proof problems attending claims of breach of this duty
would be enormous. Not only would the fact finder have to determine what items of information
were communicated from doctor to patient, but also the manner and order in which the items were
communicated.
124. This paper has not touched upon such issues as whether patients understand the informa-
tion given to them, whether they are able to recall that information accurately when a decision has to
be made, or whether elements of coercion are present that limit the voluntariness of decision making.
Considerable empirical research has focused upon each of these areas. For a comprehensive analysis
of the empirical studies done on informed consent, see Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discus-
sion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 265
(1983). The various studies dealing with each of the aforementioned areas raise questions in their
own right as to the efficacy of the decision causation issue. This article has focused solely on the
decision-making process as it relates to causation. We have assumed accurate understanding and
recall of information on the part of the patient, and that he is uncoerced. Obviously, the extent to
which any of the above hypotheses are untrue even further compromises the decision causation issue.
Given the enormity of the empirical literature dealing with informed consent, little in the way of
reliable studies sheds light on the relationship between information and decision causation. Several
investigators found little correlation between detailed disclosure of risk and patient refusal to under-
take a diagnostic test or therapeutic procedure. Alfidi, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reac-
tion, 216 J. A.M.A. 1325, 1328 (1971); Leydhecker, Gramer & Krieglstein, Patient Information
Before Cataract Surgery, 180 OPHTHALMOLOGICA, BASEL 241 (1980). Contrary results were re-
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In this context, note that the uncertainties identified in this article
concern only one of the links in the causal chain connecting the missing
information to the patient's injury. This article has focused on the deci-
sion causation125  link-demonstrating that the lack of information
caused the patient to decide to go forward with the procedure. The other
link in the causal chain, injury causation, 26 is also critical to an informed
consent claim. Unless the procedure caused the patient's injury, the lack
of information did not cause the injury. As Shultz and others have
shown, however, injury causation is not simple either. 27 The possible
effects of doing nothing, performing the recommended procedure, or per-
forming an alternative procedure present a complex probabilistic tableau
that one must fully explore to conclude that injury causation is
present. 128
Clearly, in the close-case context of informed consent litigation, one
cannot credibly demonstrate decision causation.' 29  Under traditional
ported in a study by Rosenberg, Informed Consent: A Reappraisal of Patients' Reactions, CAL.
MED., Nov. 1973, at 64, 67 (in an experimentally designed study, 50% of subjects would have re-
fused the procedure because of risks of which they had been informed). Faden & Beauchamp, Deci-
sion Making and Informed Consent: A Study of the Impact of Disclosed Information, 7 Soc.
INDICATORS RES. 313, 326 (1980), explicitly sought to study the causal relationship between deci-
sions and disclosed information concerning nonsurgical contraceptive techniques and found no evi-
dence that the patients based their decisions on information about the techniques.
Professors Meisel and Roth conclude that most studies are seriously wanting because they do
not separate the numerous variables that could affect decision making. They believe that the actual
relationship between information and causation is "probably far more complex than the simple lin-
ear relationships hypothesized and tested in these studies." Meisel & Roth, supra, at 324.
Given the multiplicity of decision heuristics discussed herein, how one would construct a re-
search protocol that could test for all the subtle interactions is difficult to imagine. Moreover, the
studies that plumb the existence of a relationship between information and decision making are
inapposite to the thesis we present. We do not seek to demonstrate the lack of connection between
information and decision making; rather, that the relationship is complex, idiosyncratic, and hence,
unpredictable. Our position, therefore, is that for courts to seek to measure the effect of an addi-
tional increment of information on an individual patient's decision is folly.
125. See supra text accompanying note 38.
126. See supra text accompanying note 39.
127. See Shultz, supra note 8, at 251, 259.
128. Id. Professor Richard Epstein has made this point with particular clarity. After present-
ing the dual causation issues that attend all informed consent cases, he argues:
The complications involved in applying the doctrine are both great and unavoidable. The possi-
bility of its incorrect application is quite substantial. In the context of any given trial the plain-
tiff will only win, if he wins at all, if all manner of doubtful inferences on questions of fact,
particularly of causation, are made in his behalf. Indeed the difficulty with this cause of action
becomes apparent once it is recalled that the plaintiff must show that the preponderance of
evidence supports his entire cause of action. It is (or should be) quite insufficient for him to
demonstrate that he is 51 percent right with respect to each of the individual elements of his
prima facie case; if that is the extent of his proof, then the probabilities of establishing the case
as a whole are well below what is required.
Epstein, supra note 29, at 125-26. While we agree with Professor Epstein that the entire case must
be supported by the preponderance of the evidence, significant debate on this point exists. See, e.g.,
Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 91; Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-I, 1979
CRIM. L. REV. 297.
129. Yet another reason that informed consent cases tend to create too-close-to-call causation
questions exists. We are grateful to Professor Richard Epstein for pointing out to us that today, the
case is rare where no information has been given to the patient. Such cases were common only
before the informed consent doctrine came on the scene. Today, as a matter of routine practice,
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models of tort litigation, this would be fatal to the patient's case under
any theory for which decision causation is an essential link. 130
Yet, in some other contexts, the legal system has been willing to
allow plaintiffs deprived of material information to recover damages
flowing from a decision without proof that the missing information
caused the decision. In the securities law area, for example, demonstrat-
ing the existence of a material misstatement or omission in proxy materi-
als is sufficient for a stockholder to challenge successfully the results of
the stockholder vote-causation is presumed from materiality.'13  Simi-
larly, when a securities fraud violation under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act 132 involves a failure to disclose, courts have, in the
past, held that "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material ....
Should patients making informed consent claims similarly benefit
from such a conclusive presumption of decision causation? Although
such suggestions are extant,' 34 we advise against such a move. First, the
impact of such a radical change would be staggering. If causation were
conclusively presumed, patients with unfortunate medical outcomes
would be able to recover damages for the harm resulting from those out-
comes each and every time the doctor failed to disclose material informa-
tion, even though the outcome followed a procedure that was reasonably
recommended and reasonably performed. Also, the plaintiff would have
to put forth absolutely no showing that anyone who knew all the facts
would have decided differently.
Second, the context of informed consent litigation should be
remembered. Informed consent doctrine is, in many ways, an overlay on
the canvas of malpractice law. Egregious medical conduct can usually be
remedied in a malpractice case in which an informed consent claim
would be superfluous. If a doctor induces a patient to agree to an unrea-
some information is given to the patient. Most often, the question is whether it was explicit or
extensive enough. Thus the causation question must ask whether the desired additional information
would have changed the patient's decision. Professor Epstein notes that this problem has arisen in
some of the informed choice drug cases. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394
Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985). In this case, the defendant warned that
life-threatening blood clots might result from use of birth control pills. The defendant did not specif-
ically mention that use of the pill could cause a "stroke." Thus, the causation issue focuses on a very
small increment of information.
130. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 8, § 41.
131. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); cf Riskin, supra note 15, at 605
nn.127, 136.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
133. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). But see Gaines v.
Houghton, 645 F.2d 761, 775 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting).
134. Riskin, supra note 15, at 603. Rosenthal suggests a standard which effectively eliminates
causation as a limiting factor in informed consent. He says that "[a] better standard of both materi-
ality and causation would be full disclosure of all of the perils and burdens involved in a course of
professional action, so long as, in the jury's judgment, a prudent person might have decided differ-
ently if full disclosure had been made." D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? 156 (1974) (emphasis added).
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sonable procedure without full disclosure of the material risks, for exam-
ple, the patient does not need an informed consent action in order to
recover against the doctor for injuries flowing from the procedure. Rec-
ommending the procedure was, itself, malpractice.
In the securities area, however, no doctrine serves the function of
malpractice law; a tort of negligently recommending an ill-advised trans-
action does not exist. 135 In the securities context, the only way to re-
cover against the party who fails to disclose material information
concerning a decision that later backfires is through a securities fraud or
proxy violation action. If such an action fails because of the difficulties of
proving causation, the nondiscloser goes free, no matter how outrageous
or ill-advised the transaction. Thus, the presumption of causation serves
a useful function in the securities area. The existence of malpractice doc-
trine, however, largely obviates the need to gloss over decision causation
in the informed consent area; malpractice damages can deter recommen-
dations of bad medical procedure without resorting to informed consent
theories and presumed decisions.
In the area of products liability informed consent, a compromise of
sorts has developed in many states. While decision causation is an ele-
ment of the action, decision causation is presumed, but rebuttably. 136
Thus, at least the burden of producing evidence of a lack of decision
causation is on the defendant. We believe that no convincing reasons for
extending this presumption to medical informed consent cases exist.
First, the patient can be adequately protected against unreasonable
medical practice without shifting the decision causation burden. For
botched procedures and treatment plans, malpractice doctrine serves
well. For informed consent cases not involving malpractice, the patient,
as we shall demonstrate,137 should be entitled to significant damages for
injury to process and dignitary rights. In products liability, however, the
process and dignitary rights, to the extent that they exist, must be much
less valuable than in the medical area. Accordingly, only proof of deci-
sion causation and resulting injury can produce any substantial payoff for
plaintiffs and, therefore, deter defendants from failing to disclose product
risks.
Second, product manufacturers have a clear profit motive to induce
consumers to buy their products, even by failing to disclose risks. While
doctors may well profit more from performing a procedure than not per-
forming it, they are paid for their time and services in any event, and
thus, may have less of an economic motive to induce patients to choose
one procedure over another. 138 Therefore, shifting the decision causation
burden in the products liability informed consent cases prompts defend-
135. Such an act, done intentionally, however, might constitute a violation of § 10(b). See gen-
erally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION chs. 9-10 (1988).
136. See cases cited supra note 66.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 141-93.
138. But see Shultz, supra note 8, at 257 & n.153.
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ants to alter an economic bias that probably has lesser influence in the
medical area.
Third, the decision to warn or not to warn with respect to a product
risk is very different than with respect to a medical procedure risk. The
product manufacturer decides whether to warn a large, indeterminate
class of people, many of whom will never come forward, even if they
suffer adverse consequences. The doctor, however, decides whether to
warn an individual in a one-on-one interaction about a unique problem
where the doctor's relationship with the patient is suffused with duties.
Finally, the considerations set forth above concerning people's abili-
ties to process information raise serious questions as to the appropriate-
ness of the rebuttable presumption even in the products liability cases.' 39
For the most part, informed choice products liability cases involve drugs
or vaccines, and patients must evaluate very remote risks. In such con-
texts, patients must evaluate and integrate data similar to that in classic
medical informed consent litigation. Likewise, the doctrines of material-
ity and strict liability filter out the easy cases, so decision causation in-
quiries are only made in the most difficult products liability cases.
Abandoning the decision causation question and honestly recognizing its
nonjusticiability has merit in products liability informed choice cases as
well as medical informed consent cases.
Nevertheless, courts are unwilling to impose informed choice liabil-
ity (in either products or medical contexts) without satisfying themselves
that decision causation is sufficiently established. But the courts cannot
practically and honestly attain that which they theoretically believe the
plaintiff must establish before they can award substantial damages. Us-
ing decision causation as the pivotal doctrine for the establishment of
liability in a milieu consisting entirely of close-call cases is even more
troubling. As noted, the twin doctrines of malpractice (or strict liability)
and materiality exclude the gross cases from informed choice litiga-
tion. ' Causation is a sensible screening device when it operates to reject
large numbers of clearly unworthy cases. Decision causation plays no
such role in informed consent litigation. In this context, decision causa-
tion operates exclusively on cases in which its error rate is significant.
When we add to the inherent error rate of close cases the decision-mak-
ing errors identified above, little reason justifies the use of decision causa-
tion in informed consent litigation.
How, then, should the legal system deal with the decision causation
139. But see Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 763, 776 (1985), arguing that the ability of manufacturers to more completely control the
framing of information presented to the consumer warrants a greater burden of proof on manufac-
turers. Notably, however, in a products liability case, unlike a medical informed consent case, estab-
lishing what information was actually communicated and in what manner is not difficult. Therefore,
one of the concerns in malpractice litigation-determining what information was actually communi-
cated and in what manner-is clearly not present in the informed choice warnings cases.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
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problem? The answer is not simple. One of us, Twerski, believes that the
cost to the legal system from the indeterminacy of decision causation in
the vast majority of nontrivial informed consent cases greatly outweighs
the benefits from those few cases in which the plaintiff can credibly
demonstrate the causal link. Accordingly, Twerski would declare the is-
sue of decision causation in informed consent situations nonjusticiable
and, thereby, reject any legal claim that requires demonstrating decision
causation. Cohen agrees with Twerski's cost-benefit calculus, but would
leave the door slightly ajar for the rare case in which the plaintiff can
credibly demonstrate decision causation. We both agree, however, that
in the bulk of cases in which the claim is that omitted material informa-
tion would have changed a plaintiff's decision, the plaintiff cannot pre-
vail. Thus, because the personal injury model of informed consent
litigation depends on proof of decision causation, we must either aban-
don or severely curtail this model.
IV. THE VALUING OF PROCESS
The abandonment or curtailment of the personal injury model for
informed choice might appear to create a significant void that potentially
could undercut, if not obliterate, the salutary developments of the last
two decades which have imposed responsibilities on physicians and man-
ufacturers to share information with their patients and customers. If de-
cision causation is nonjusticiable, and the plaintiff cannot lay subsequent
personal injuries at the doorstep of the defendant who failed to provide
the desired information, informed choice emerges as a sanctionless tort.
Admittedly, nominal damages could vindicate a pure dignitary right, but
they would not likely encourage information sharing. Thus, where the
personal injury model may suffer from overinflated damages resulting
from unrealistic conclusions about decision causation, a dignitary rights
model might suffer from serious undervaluation because of the tradition
of valuing such rights minimally.
The feast or famine dimension that characterizes existing tort mod-
els is no mere accident of fate. The polarity is a product of a myopic
view of the values implicated in informed choice cases. Currently both
models perceive choice decisions from a static rather than a dynamic
perspective. The plaintiff's decision is viewed as a res of sorts. Given a
failure to provide information, the question for the courts is how much
value should be assigned to the lost decision. Given the de minimis re-
covery under the dignitary rights model, it is not surprising that the
courts have chosen the seriously flawed personal injury model. To be
sure, informed choice includes both personal injury and dignitary rights
aspects, but neither adequately describes the gravamen of the harm the
defendant inflicts. Only by substantially recasting the essence of the
cause of action will the courts develop a structure sensitive to the true
damages inflicted when choice is curtailed or effectively eliminated.
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Informed choice is, first and foremost, a process right. It reflects
process values in two important ways. First, informed choice protects
the right of the patient or consumer to evaluate all material information
in making decisions. The ultimate decision that the plaintiff would have
reached had he been fully informed is not the focus here. Rather, the
exclusion of the plaintiff from the deliberative decision-making process
lies at the heart of the cause of action. To properly assess damages for
the deprivation of the right to deliberate and participate in decision mak-
ing, one must examine how the law has valued process rights in analo-
gous contexts. Second, decision making is rarely a single event. It is
most often an ongoing process, with its own peaks and valleys and points
of indeterminacy before the final decision. This process possesses a dyna-
mism all its own. The single-minded focus on valuing decision outcome
has diverted attention from the significance of decision input. When
viewed as a dynamic process, informed choice rights are far from trivial
and can be independently valued.
A. Constitutional Analogies
Valuing process rights has a long history in actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983141 alleging deprivation of civil rights under color of state law. For
many decades, courts have permitted juries to evaluate violations of these
process rights and assign significant damages to them. 142
Judicial scrutiny has focused upon two categories of process rights.
In the first category, the plaintiff has been denied access to a forum
designed to insure that a substantive right is not unjustly denied. The
prototype of this cause of action is the now celebrated Carey v. Piphus 143
decision, where students who had allegedly violated school rules sued
school board members for suspending them from school without grant-
141. In 1871, Congress created a cause of action to redress the violation of constitutional rights
by persons acting under color of state law. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (now
codified with minor modification in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). In its present form it reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
For a thorough treatment of the subject, see S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (2d ed. 1986); M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES (1986).
142. See cases cited infra note 146.
143. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Litigation on a broad range of procedural due process violations is
commonplace. See, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (discharge of a police
officer without pretermination hearing entitled officer to damages); Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669
(7th Cir. 1984) (violation of prisoner's fifth amendment due process rights to hearing for violation of
prison discipline resulting in segregation and other discomforts is compensable); Laje v. Thomason
Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1982) (discharge of a doctor is authorized, but not without
pretermination discharge hearing).
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ing them a formal hearing prior to suspension. In Carey, a procedural
due process right (designed to insure, inter alia, that the right to attend
school was not abrogated for improper reasons nor based on insufficient
evidence) protected the substantive "property" right to attend school.
The second category of process rights is more substantive in nature. A
plaintiff denied the right to vote in an election'" or the right to free
speech14 5 complains that the state has abridged a right to become part of
a decision-making process or to speak freely. In this genre of cases, sub-
stance and procedure merge into one; the process right does not exist
solely to protect a separate substantive right.
Prior to Carey v. Piphus, a plaintiff denied process rights of either
category did not have to establish a demonstrable injury to recover sub-
stantial damages. 146 Demonstrable injury in the form of mental distress
clearly enhanced the plaintiff's claim for damages. 147 But courts clearly
announced that the denial of the right, in and of itself, was of significant
moment and could support substantial awards.
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515 148 reflects the
pre-Carey attitude of the courts with regard to the valuation of proce-
dural due process rights. In that case plaintiff, a junior college president,
alleged that the college board dismissed him because of views he had
expressed concerning an ethnic studies program. In addition to charging
a violation of first amendment freedom of speech rights, the plaintiff
claimed damages because the board dismissed him without a hearing.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the board
terminated plaintiff for just cause, not because of his constitutional exer-
cise of first amendment rights. 149 The court then turned to the board's
denial to the plaintiff of a pretermination hearing. Given the finding of
the district court that the board dismissed plaintiff for just cause, the
court concluded that it was "inconceivable that even if plaintiff had been
accorded due process rights he would have been allowed to continue in
office."' 50 Thus, "[t]he wrong done plaintiff was not the termination of
his employment . . . but the deprivation of his procedural due process
right to notice and hearing. '
In its remand instructions to the lower court, the circuit court ac-
knowledged that valuation of the procedural right was not free from diffi-
144. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919).
145. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Burle v. Southworth,
611 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1979); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
146. Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F.
Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1971). In
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978), the Court took issue with the authority relied on by
Hostrop to support substantial damages for the vindication of a due process right.
147. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
148. 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
149. Id. at 573, 579.
150. Id. at 579.
151. Id.
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culties. "'52 Damages reflecting the amount plaintiff would have been
awarded had the board terminated the contract without just cause were
clearly inappropriate. 5 3 The court had to value the procedural right for
its own intrinsic worth. Citing case law dating back six decades, the
court said:
Although the amount of damages for such an injury cannot be de-
termined by reference to an objective standard, recovery of non-pu-
nitive damages for the deprivation of intangible rights for which no
pecuniary loss can be shown is not without precedent. Courts have
traditionally assessed such damages for tortious injury. 54
A year later, in Piphus v. Carey,'55 Judge Tone, the author of Hostrop,
unmistakably and clearly announced that damages were recoverable:
even if ... there is no proof of individualized injury to the plaintiff,
such as mental distress (which, when found to have been suffered
would enhance the general damages recoverable), and even if no pe-
cuniary loss is shown. The amount of the damage to be awarded
when no individualized injury is shown is dependent on the nature
of the wrong. The amount fixed by the District Court should be
neither so small as to trivialize the right nor so large to provide a
windfall. 156
The position of the courts with regard to substantive constitutional
rights was stronger yet. As early as 1919, in Wayne v. Venable,"' the
Eighth Circuit upheld a verdict for $2,000 in favor of each voter the
defendants' conspiracy prevented from exercising a right to vote. In elo-
quent language, which has been quoted countless times, the court said:
In the eyes of the law this right is so valuable that damages are
presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of
actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing, and the
amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of the jury because each member of the jury has per-
sonal knowledge of the value of the right.' 58
Indeed, over sixty years ago the Supreme Court accepted the principle
that deprivation of the right to vote causes compensable damages.' 59
The analogy to informed choice litigation is compelling. The pur-
pose of the duty of a physician or a manufacturer to share information is
to empower the plaintiff, if he desires, to become a participant in an im-
portant decision-making process concerning his own body. To hold this
process right hostage to personal injury damages is as illogical as deni-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
156. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
157. 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919).
158. Id. at 66.
159. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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grating the value of the right to vote in an election because the vote
would not have altered the election result. Courts should value the deci-
sion right and assess substantial damages for its violation, even though
plaintiffs cannot realistically establish decision causation.
In valuing the right to information in the informed choice context,
supporting recoveries well in excess of those awarded in the constitu-
tional tort cases is appropriate. t6 Arguably, restricting damages in the
constitutional setting is proper because other deterrent forces serve to
abridge the undesirable conduct. Criminal sanctions, injunctive relief,
and the award of attorney's fees to successful litigants act as partial, if
incomplete, deterrents. 16' The glare of public reaction and the power of
elective reform further serve as partial curbs on undesirable behavior.
However, only damages that create the appropriate deterrent against uni-
lateral decision making can enforce the right to information in the medi-
cal and products contexts.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Carey v.
Piphus162 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura 163 do not
contradict this thesis. Admittedly, taken together, these cases hold that,
for the violation of both procedural and substantive constitutional rights,
a court may not award anything but nominal damages if the plaintiff
establishes no other damages. For several reasons, however, the Court's
pronouncements in these cases should have little bearing on the wisdom
of recognizing compensation to accomplish pure deterrence in the in-
formed choice setting. First, the Court argued that no historical prece-
dent supports deterrence through section 1983 actions based on anything
other than compensation of the plaintiff."6 Second, as noted above, the
Court recognized that even if inferred damages for the violation of con-
stitutional rights are not recognized, other deterrent forces work to pro-
tect those rights.165  Third, the Carey-Stachura doctrine has been the
object of blistering academic commentary.' 66 Finally, Stachura may
have resurrected the valuation-of-the-right doctrine shortly after inter-
160. Pre-Carey process right violations with no proof of actual damages tended to yield small
presumed damage awards. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (five
hundred dollars); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (five hundred dollars).
161. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256 n.ll (1978).
162. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
163. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
164. Carey, 435 U.S. at 256.
165. Id. at 256-57 & n.1l.
166. See, e.g., Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1242 (1979); Note, Damage A wards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey
v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980). Post-Carey, several circuits continued to recognize dam-
ages for the abstract value of substantive constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep.
School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1408-11 (10th Cir. 1985); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220,
1227-29 (8th Cir. 1981); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1016 (1980). For excellent discussions identifying reasons for recognizing intrinsic rather than in-
strumental values, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7 (2d ed. 1988); Sapphire,
Specifying Due Process Values: Toward A More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978).
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ring it. The Court noted that it was objecting to evaluation of a constitu-
tional right. However, the Court opined:
[W]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to
have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed
damages may possibly be appropriate. In those circumstances, pre-
sumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plain-
tiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be
impossible to measure.
167
Once courts recognize that decision causation is nonjusticiable, they
can use the constitutional rights cases as an analogous guide to an in-
formed choice action seeking recovery for the denial of a right to engage
in a significant decision-making process. 168 These constitutional rights
cases clearly differentiate between the outcome of the process and the
denial of participation in the process itself. 
169
167. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1986) (citations
omitted). S. NAHMOD, supra note 141, § 4.01, notes that Carey seemed to draw a distinction be-
tween inappropriate presumed and appropriate inferred damages. Thus, the Court is apparently
willing to allow for recovery of process right damages so long as they are dressed in the garb of
compensatory damages, not valuing the intrinsic right. Because the plaintiff may not be able to
prove other actual damages, she may apparently recover the intrinsic damages, albeit as
compensatories.
168. Professor Nahmod has correctly drawn the distinction between the existence of a constitu-
tional violation and cause-in-fact for damages purposes. With regard to the violation of the constitu-
tional right, plaintiff bears the burden of proving a violation. Once the violation is established,
however, Carey shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that no "but for" relation between the constitutional violation and plaintiff's damages ex-
isted. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1978); S. NAHMOD, supra note 141, § 4.02.
Notably, in Carey, 435 U.S. at 261 n.16, the Court responded to the argument of respondent
that damages for the violation of the intrinsic right were necessary because respondent was "de-
prived of the chance to present facts or arguments in mitigation to the initial decision maker," and
that "[i]t can never be known . . . what, if anything, the exercise of such an opportunity to plead
one's cause on judgmental or discretionary grounds would have availed." This argument questions
the justiciability of decision causation. The Court, in our opinion, correctly rejected the argument.
The issues and all the mitigating facts were before the lower court, and there was no reason why they
could not resolve how they would have ruled on a closed set of facts. This context is far different
than adjudicating decision causation in informed consent litigation, where the fact finder has no way
of predicting how the factual data would have been integrated by the decision maker.
169. Numerous scholars have discussed the importance of process-related rights. E.g., Sum-
mers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Process-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1974). Frank Michelman has explored the values of process as though process has some independ-
ent value, in and of itself. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-77. Recent works in feminist legal theory also
emphasize the importance of process as an independent value in various senses. Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (process
of judicial decision making), Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (dialectical process of rights assertion and social
change).
Some might question why we propose to value a process which is subject to so much irrational-
ity. As discussed supra note 91, we take no position with regard to the irrationality of decision
making. We argue only that decision making is hopelessly unpredictable, and hence, nonjusticiable.
Furthermore, the process arguments set forth in this article do not depend on decision-making ra-
tionality for their verity. Decision making is an important reflection of autonomy, and hence, wor-
thy of protection without regard to either its rationality or its predictability.
We take no position in this article about whether process rights should be protected in other
legal contexts. Medical choice and products liability cases have already recognized a duty to convey
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B. Valuing Autonomous Decision Making
Relying on the personal injury model in informed consent cases not
only has diverted attention from valuing the intrinsic right to participate
in decision making, it has also been responsible for the lack of analysis, in
the literature, of what values autonomous decision making fosters.
Though the discussion that follows is primarily instrumentalist, separat-
ing the instrumental value from the inherent value of the right itself is
often difficult.170
1. The Trauma of Suddenness
A patient suffering from a disease who undergoes a therapeutic in-
tervention usually has a basic understanding of the normal progression of
the illness. The ability of the patient to mentally adjust to and gradually
accommodate the changed reality brought about by the illness substan-
tially reduces shock and anxiety. Illnesses that are severe and sudden in
their onset, such as heart attacks and strokes, produce enormous anxiety
for those who suffer first exposures because of the suddenness of the in-
sult.1 7  In a matter of a few minutes, the victim's world has drastically
changed. Not unlike the traumatic neurosis that follows a sudden and
unexpected accident, the unexpected nature of the harm takes a toll sepa-
rate and apart from the medical injury itself.' 72
When a doctor deprives a patient of information with regard to risks
that attend therapeutic intervention and the risks actually occur, the pa-
tient is beset by serious and unexpected psychological iatrogenic injury,
in addition to the physical injury. Not only does the patient suffer need-
less trauma, but the patient is also profoundly troubled that medical ther-
apy induced the trauma. The very therapy designed to heal has caused
serious injury. Similarly, the purchaser of a product who has no reason
to believe that the product will harm him often confronts sudden and
unexpected emotional injury when a product which he previously per-
information to give the recipient decision-making power. These two areas raise particularly vexing
decision causation issues when personal injury damage awards are based on the hypothesis of an
alternative choice. To our knowledge, no other areas of the law present the extreme problems indig-
enous to these two discrete subject matters.
170. In order to assure that the informed choice doctrine produces the proper level of deter-
rence, courts will need to value both the process right itself and the factors set forth below. As
Professor Richard Epstein has reminded us, many plaintiffs will not bring suit for the violation of
informed consent rules, even though the level of information provided was inadequate. If the patient
who wishes to bring suit does not have adequate incentive to do so, the right may pass into oblivion.
This means that incentives to protect the process right should be seriously assessed. This does not
necessarily support using personal injury damages as the measure of the process right.
171. See Stern, Psychiatric Management of Acute Myocardial Infarction in the Coronary Care
Unit, 60 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 59J (1987).
172. Such damages are routinely alleged in personal injury claims. See M. BELLI, MODERN
DAMAGES § 259 (1960); see also Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Pro-
cess, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 165-68 (1984); Wolfensberger & Menolascino, A Theoretical Framework
for the Management of Parents of the Mentally Retarded, in PSYCHIATRIC APPROACHES TO
MENTAL RETARDATION ch. 20, at 478-81 (F. Menolascino ed. 1970).
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ceived as beneficial or totally benign injures him. Although these dam-
ages fall primarily within the category of mental distress and do not
reflect the physical injury which results from the uninformed risks of the
therapeutic intervention, the seriousness of the physical injury will none-
theless affect the severity of the damage done by the corresponding emo-
tional injury. A patient who is suddenly paralyzed or without bladder
control has good reason to react with panic. The occurrence of more
minor risks is likely to be less disconcerting.
Not all informed consent cases involve unexpected trauma. But,
this kind of shock plays an important role in a significant percentage of
the cases. The harm is not trivial and deserves recognition.1 73 Because
the doctor caused the trauma by her failure to warn the patient of the
risks, the traumatic nature of the injury Should be cognizable whether or
not the patient would have consented to the therapeutic intervention if
fully informed.
2. Willingness and Acceptance
A patient who is fully informed for reasoned decision making brings
personal willingness and acceptance to the ultimate decision. This point
173. Shultz believes that the law of informed consent's major importance is to provide choice
between alternative therapies. She attaches minor significance to the duty to inform a patient about
remote risks. See Shultz, supra note 8, at 228. We believe that even remote risk information is of
considerable importance.
An excellent review of the literature dealing with the direct health benefits which inure to pa-
tients who are adequately informed of possible risks and negative aspects which attend therapeutic
and diagnostic procedures is found in Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking
Process, supra note 172, at 164-75. The classic work on this subject is I. JANIS, PSYCHOLOGICAL
STRESS: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF SURGICAL PATIENTS (1958). See also I.
JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 109. The crux of Janis' thesis is that preparation for impending crisis
or disaster causes what he calls the "work of worrying." This emotional inoculation permits the
patient to develop a set of psychological defenses so that the patient is better able to cope with the
adversity when and if it becomes a reality.
The work of Janis has been repeatedly tested in a variety of settings. Widespread agreement
exists that well-informed patients display a better ability to cope with adversity. See, e.g., Johnson &
Leventhal, Effects of Accurate Expectations and Behavioral Instructions on Reactions During a Nox-
ious Medical Examination, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 710 (1974); Levy & McGeei
Childbirth and a Crisis: A Test of Janis' Theory of Communication and Stress Resolution, 31 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 171 (1975); Schmitt & Woolridge, Psychological Preparation of
Surgical Patients, 22 NURSING RES. 108 (1973). Some researchers have questioned whether the
mechanism which accounts for reduced stress results from the "work of worrying." See Vernon &
Bigelow, Effect of Information About a Potentially Stressful Situation on Responses to Stress Impact,
29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 50 (1974). Another has questioned its validity when ap-
plied to some personality types. See Andrew, Recovery From Surgery, with and Without Preparatory
Instruction, for Three Coping Styles, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 223 (1970).
A recent study has suggested that providing a patient a choice between alternative surgical
procedures may reduce anxiety level both before and after surgery. Morris & Royle, Offering Pa-
tients a Choice ofSurgeryfor Early Breast Cancer: A Reduction in Anxiety and Depression in Patients
and Their Husbands, 26 Soc. SCI. MED. 583 (1988). The researchers studied two groups of patients
who suffered from early stages of breast cancer. One group was given a choice between simple
mastectomy and wide excision plus radiotherapy and another group was given no choice (simple
mastectomy was performed due to the location of the tumor). A significantly higher percentage of
the patients not offered a choice of surgery experienced clinical levels of anxiety and depression both
before and after the operation compared with the patients who were offered a choice.
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is obvious and seems unnecessary to belabor. However, this very obvious
point has eluded the courts. Their preoccupation with decision causation
has prevented them from identifying this very real deprivation as one
worthy of significant compensation.
The wrongful birth cases illustrate how little attention the courts
have given to these values.' 74 Consider the following hypothetical cases.
Their respective obstetricians do not inform two pregnant women in their
late thirties that amniocentesis can detect whether their fetuses have
Down's syndrome. Both women subsequently give birth to children that
suffer from the disability. One woman is a stalwart right-to-life advocate
who has lectured throughout the country declaring that under no cir-
cumstances would she ever have an abortion. The second woman has
not only supported liberal availability of abortion as a national policy,
but has, during her nationwide lectures, clearly stated that if she know-
ingly faced the prospect of bearing a child with a serious birth defect, she
would abort the fetus. Following the traditional decision causation rules,
the proabortion plaintiff could establish a case for wrongful birth dam-
ages from the denial to her of information which would have led her to a
decision to abort.' 75 A court would probably dismiss the right-to-life
174. Wrongful birth cases involve claims by parents against health care providers for failing to
inform the parents of the risks of having a child with a serious birth defect. See, e.g., Gallagher v.
Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
The parents invariably claim that had they been adequately informed they would have chosen
to abort the fetus, and thus, would not have incurred the expense of raising the handicapped child.
Since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), almost all courts passing on the question have recognized
the cause of action. See Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment,
100 HARV. L. REv. 2017, 2018 n.5 (1987).
Wrongful birth actions, brought on behalf of the parents, should be distinguished from wrong-
ful life actions, brought on behalf of the child that is born with the birth defect. In contrast to
wrongful birth actions, the wrongful life actions have not been well-received by the courts. Because
the child contends that as a result of the health care provider's negligence she was born to suffer, her
claim is essentially that she would have been better off not being born. This argument finds its
antecedent in Job 3:2. Courts refuse to value the injury to the child who was wrongfully born,
because damages must reflect a comparison with the condition of nothingness-the result if the
parents had aborted the fetus. See Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 Il1. 2d 482, 485, 499 N.E.2d 406, 407
(1986); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, No. 86SC307, slip op. at 20 n.10 (Colo. Nov. 28, 1988); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01. But see Turpin v. Sortini,
31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d
755 (1984).
175. The wrongful birth cases are predicated upon the ability of the parents to establish that had
they been informed of the likely birth defect, the mother would have chosen to abort. See, e.g.,
Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[B]ut for defendant's negligent failure to
inform Mrs. Robak of her rubella and its consequences, she would have obtained an abortion and the
Robaks would not have suffered the damages for which they seek recovery."); Smith v. Cote, 128
N.H. 231, 241, 513 A.2d 341, 347 (1986) (causation is established if plaintiff can show "that, but for
the defendants' negligent failure to inform her of the risks of bearing a child with birth defects, she
would have obtained an abortion."); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 776, 233 N.W.2d
372, 377 (1975) (plaintiffs must convince trier of fact that if informed of effects of rubella on the fetus
that the parents "would have sought and submitted to an abortion of the wife."); see also Capron,
Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 638 n.90 (1979); Note, Father and
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plaintiff's claim on summary judgment. After all, she would not have
chosen to abort in any event. Yet, such a result would, in our opinion, be
wholly unjustified.
Parents who are deeply committed to a religious or ethical position
against abortion are entitled to exercise their choice consistent with their
religious or ethical precepts. Denial of that choice deprives them of sig-
nificant rights. "The moral affront . . . is not diminished because the
parents, if given the choice, would have permitted the birth of the child.
The crucial moral decision, which was theirs to make, was denied
them." 176
Even if the parents' choice would have been the same, they were
deprived of the opportunity to give expression to important moral
choices. One can easily imagine soul-searching discussions between hus-
band and wife in which they choose to affirm that they are prepared to
practice what they preach. Consultation with religious leaders may pro-
vide them solace, if not a sense that their actions are saintly. The bless-
ing of time to accommodate while they still have options may deepen
their resolve that the child is indeed wanted. Moreover, earlier knowl-
edge would give the couple several months to prepare for the conse-
quences of their decision.
The role of willingness and acceptance is of equal importance in the
Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE
L.J. 1488, 1509-10 (arguing for subjective causation test in genetic counseling cases).
176. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 439, 404 A.2d 8, 18 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In speaking of the damages suffered by parents who gave birth to a child
with Down's syndrome and were not told of the risk and the availability of amniocentesis to test for
the condition, Handler argued:
Without doubt, expectant parents, kept in ignorance of severe and permanent defects af-
fecting their unborn child, suffer greatly when the awful truth dawns upon them with the birth
of the child. Human experience has told each of us, personally or vicariously, something of this
anguish. Parents of such a child experience a welter of negative feelings-bewilderment, guilt,
remorse and anguish-as well as anger, depression and despair. When such a tragedy comes
without warning these terrible emotions are bound to be felt even more deeply. "Novelty
shock" may well exacerbate the suffering. This, I believe, is the crux of the wrong done in this
case. Through the failure of the doctors to advise an expectant mother, and father, of the
likelihood or certainty of the birth of a mongoloid child, the parents were given no opportunity
to cushion the blow, mute the hurt, or prepare themselves as parents for the birth of their
seriously impaired child. Their injury is real and palpable. Moreover, it is not easy to overcome
these feelings or adjust to the tragedy of having a defective child. It is recognized that a mother,
even in normal circumstances, may suffer depressive and negative feelings upon the birth of a
healthy child If her psychological state has been further impaired by the shock of the birth of a
defective child her recovery may well be even more prolonged and dubious. In any given case,
the mental and emotional suffering of parents might continue for some period of time beyond
the birth of a child and should be recognized as an important aspect of the parents' injury.
Because of the unique nature of the tort, involving as it does the denial of the opportunity
to decide whether to become the parents of a handicapped child, the suffering of the parents
assumes another, important dimension. There should be recognized in the stressful setting of
this case the reality of moral injury. Such injury may be thought of as the deprivation of moral
initiative and ethical choice. Persons, confronted with the awesome decision of whether or not
to allow the birth of a defective child, face a moral dilemma of enormous consequence. They
deal with a profound moral problem. To be denied the opportunity-indeed, the right-to
apply one's own moral values in reaching that decision, is a serious, irreversible wrong.
Id. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (citations omitted). See also Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 360, 478
A.2d 755, 766-67 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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more traditional medical informed choice case. Most people are pain-
fully aware that illness deprives them of enormous freedom and that their
options are limited. However, when someone unilaterally takes away
even the few choices left to them, bitterness and anger follow.
Again, the focus on personal injury damages misses the point. The
law tells physicians that they should provide information to enhance the
patient's right to decline a recommended procedure, thus avoiding its
attendant risks, or to permit alternate decisions to be made. But doctors
intuitively know that rarely will patients second-guess their recommen-
dations. 77 And in any event, doctors believe that replaying the hypo-
thetical decision making of a patient presented with a reasonable
recommendation is impossible.' 78 The single-minded obsession with de-
cision causation has prevented the law from sending the appropriate
message to doctors. Information for alternate decision making is not of
primary importance, but rather, information for involvement in the pro-
cess of decision making is crucial.' 79 In any event, the former is often
illusory. The doctor denies the latter right in all cases where she acts
without fully informing the patient.
3. Valuing the Options
Not all choice deprivations are of equal magnitude. When valuing
the denial to the plaintiff of his right to exercise options, one must con-
177. Beecher, Consent in Clinical Experimentation: Myth and Reality, 195 J. A.M.A. 34, 34-35
(1966); see also Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 465, 466
(1972). In a study by Appelbaum & Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical Hospitals, in 2 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. D, the authors report on the reasons that patients
refused therapeutic and diagnostic intervention in hospitals. They conclude that the failure to pro-
vide adequate information was "by itself an inadequate explanation for refusal" of treatment. Id. at
423 (emphasis in original). The authors catalogue a wide variety of noninformation reasons that
they believe motivated patient refusal. In many instances, doctors or other health care providers
were able to convince the patient to agree to the procedure.
Lidz & Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2 MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, app. C, investigated the role of informed consent in differing treat-
ment settings. They conclude that:
Fundamentally, patients feel that they are unequal to the task of making medical decisions,
even when provided information to do so. They feel no more equipped to decide which treat-
ment among several alternatives to choose than the average person does to choose between
several ways to build a wall. If we want a wall built, we tell the contractor to use brick and
where to put it. The contractor chooses the brick and the mortar, hires the assistants, and
decides whether to use two or three layers of brick. If a sick person wants his illness attended
to, he feels that he is well-advised to hire a physician, osteopath, or chiropractor to deal with it.
The patient chooses the doctor and presents the problem. The rest is the doctor's concern.
Although it is sheer speculation, it is possible that what deters doctors from obtaining
informed consent in conformity with the spirit of the doctrine is that they know, and have long
known, what we have found in this study: that patients are not interested in, nor do they believe
that they are capable of, playing the role assigned by law. Knowing this-and believing, too,
that patients are not capable of playing that role-doctors do not take the time and effort them-
selves to comply with the legal dictates addressed to them.
Id. at 403-04.
178. See, e.g., Beecher, Some Guiding Principles for Clinical Investigation, 195 J. A.M.A. 1135
(1966); Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579 (1976); Ravitch, Informed
Consent-Descent to Absurdity, MED. TIMES, Sept. 1973, at 164.
179. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 8, ch. 7, at 153-54.
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sider the range of options available and their possible benefits and detri-
ments. The greater the range of benefits available through alternate
choice, the greater the harm done to the choice-making process. A pa-
tient facing two alternative surgical procedures with only slightly differ-
ent benefits and only slightly different risks of paralysis is deprived of less
by the denial of information than a woman facing a choice between radi-
cal mastectomy and chemotherapy. Once more, the focus on the unde-
sirable result rather than on the uninformed nature of the decision-
making process has diverted attention from the actual damages that flow
from a crippled decision-making process.
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemical, Inc. 180 illustrates the
very high cost of failing to identify and value the range of options denied
plaintiffs. In that case, eight former employees of Milacron sued their
employer for subjecting them to noxious chemical fumes which caused
them injury. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, though it had
knowledge that the situation existed, "failed to correct said conditions,
failed to warn appellants-employees of the dangers and conditions that
existed and failed to report said conditions to the various state and fed-
eral agencies to which they were required to report by law.' ' 81
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations, the trial court
dismissed plaintiffs' actions because workers' compensation covered the
employer, and thus immunized the employer from tort liability. On ap-
peal the Ohio Supreme Court noted the allegations that Milacron had
intentionally failed to warn its employees of the dangers of the toxic
chemicals. The court held that the Ohio Legislature did not intend the
Ohio worker compensation statute to immunize employers from inten-
tionally tortious conduct, and thus, recognized a common law right to
tort recovery. In a sharp partial dissent, Justice Locher took issue with
the majority's intentional tort analysis.' 82 He argued that if the employer
did not act with "knowledge to substantial certainty" that harm would
result, then mere knowledge on the part of the employer that it was sub-
jecting plaintiffs to a risk of harm did not constitute an intentional
tort. 183
In Jones v. VIP Development Co.,84 the Ohio Supreme Court ex-
panded Blankenship beyond toxic torts. In a set of cases consolidated for
appeal, the court allowed the intentional tort exception to include failure
to warn employees about dangers from high voltage distribution lines on
the premises and from removing a safety cover from a discharge chute.
The court relied on the definition of intent embodied in gection 8A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which includes instances where the de-
fendant desired to bring about the harm or acted with knowledge to sub-
180. 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
181. Id. at 609, 433 N.E.2d at 574.
182. Id. at 620-21, 433 N.E.2d at 580-82 (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 621, 433 N.E.2d at 581 (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984).
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stantial certainty that the harm would come about.185 The court said:
"A defendant who fails to warn of a known defect or hazard which poses
a grave threat of injury may reasonably be considered to have acted de-
spite a belief that harm is substantially certain to occur."'8 6
Scholarly writings have scathingly attacked Blankenship and
Jones.'"7 If the logic of these cases held true, then workers' compensa-
tion immunity could be easily bypassed by an allegation that the em-
ployer was aware of a risk and had intentionally not corrected it.
Employers sought and ultimately accomplished legislative reform which
brought the intentional tort exception back into line with the traditional
definition of intent.1 88
The court should have analyzed Blankenship as an informed choice
case. The employer had in its possession information regarding the toxic
nature of the work environment that it did not share with its employees.
The employees were entitled to the information so that they could choose
among a broad range of options in deciding whether to continue working
in the presence of such toxic chemicals, and if so, under what terms they
wished to do so. Terminating their employment was not the only option
available to the employees. For example, with full knowledge of the dan-
ger, they might have bargained for pay increases that reflected the high
risk of exposure to toxicants, or for health, disability, and death benefits.
Or employees might have bargained for lessened exposure to the risk
through shorter hours, alternate shifts between tasks which entailed ex-
posure to toxic fumes and those which did not, gas masks, and so on.
The failure to identify and value these options was, we believe, re-
sponsible for the legislative overruling of the Blankenship doctrine. The
Blankenship court struggled to find a defensible reason for excluding the
employer from workers' compensation immunity. It reasoned that the
workers' compensation bargain covered only negligent torts and not situ-
ations with a clear intent to harm. However, this was not a case of an
employer physically assaulting an employee. The harm that eventuated
was not substantially certain to follow from the exposure to toxic fumes.
The defendant merely knew that a risk of harm was present. In its zeal
to reach such conduct, the court stretched intentional tort principles to
cover an employer who acted with knowledge of risks which could pro-
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
186. Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 96, 472 N.E.2d at 1052.
187. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Worker's Compensation Law, 16
GA. L. REV. 775, 803 (1982); Comment, In the Wake of Blankenship: Following Footprints in the
Mire of Intentional Torts in the Workplace in Ohio, 12 N. Ky. L. REV. 267 (1985). The leading
treatise describes the Ohio court "as if driven by some passionate determination to destroy the exclu-
siveness principle altogether." A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.15, at 13-
54 (J. Duke ed. 1988).
188. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987) now defines "intentional
tort" as "an act committed with the intent to injure another or committed with the belief that the
injury is substantially certain to occur." Even where intent is established, only a limited recovery
from a special intentional tort fund is allowed. Id. § 4121.80(D)-(E).
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duce physical injury. Such an approach presented a real threat to the
integrity of workers' compensation.
The court was correct that refusal of an employer to share a private
cache of information with employees is wholly inconsistent with the
workers' compensation bargain, but not because the employer has acted
intentionally to cause harm. If employees face risks of which they are
unaware, and upon which they are unable to obtain information, they
enter the employment relationship with severely crippled bargaining
power. Potential personal injury goes to the heart of the employment
relationship. That employees would agree to a workers' compensation
bargain when unable to evaluate the risks of employment is
inconceivable.
Blankenship stands apart from the run-of-the-mill workers' compen-
sation case because the employer totally excluded the workers from the
process of risk evaluation and legitimate choice making. In Jones, how-
ever, the employer did not block employees as a class from discovering
general risks attendant to employment. Employees may have been ill-
informed as to a particular risk on a given day, but this hardly warrants
abandonment of workers' compensation immunity. In short, Blanken-
ship implicated information crucial to the fundamental employment deci-
sion-whether to work for a particular employer and on what terms.
Jones dealt with failure to provide information knowable by employees (if
not actually known to the plaintiffs). Thus, Jones dealt with risk, not
choice. Workers' compensation traditionally covers injuries from such
risks.
Had Blankenship articulated a narrow choice-based exception to
workers' compensation, rather than the intent-based broadside, it likely
would not have engendered the kind of opposition that led to its legisla-
tive repeal. The intent-based exception opened the door to full personal
injury recovery in a significant percentage of workers' compensation
cases. A choice-based, process exception would have narrowed both the
scope of cases and the amounts recoverable, with a correspondingly di-
minished threat to the workers' compensation system.
The cost of treating all cases with personal injuries as "personal in-
jury" cases is substantial. Where choice-making and process values are
the gravamen of the harm, they must be identified and valued separate
and apart from the resultant personal injury. Whether courts should
ever recompense the resultant personal injury in informed choice litiga-
tion is a matter to which we now turn our attention.
4. Compensating for the Bad Result
As indicated above, the authors disagree whether plaintiffs should
recover for physical injuries that occur following a decision predicated on
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inadequate information. 189 We agree, however, that, at a minimum, in
the traditional informed consent case the plaintiff should not recover per-
sonal injury damages unless he is able to establish circumstances that
provide some assurance of integrity to the decision causation finding.
Furthermore, with regard to a narrow band of cases, we both believe that
a strong case can be made to allow full recovery of personal injury
damages.
Not all medical informed consent cases involve medical decisions:
some decisions relate almost solely to personal values and personal pref-
erences. Medicine merely provides the backdrop for a decision that is
truly nonmedical in nature. The wrongful birth cases, discussed earlier,
are illustrative.1 9° The decision whether to abort a fetus in the first tri-
mester is relatively free of medical risk and does not require sensitive
evaluation of medical risk data. The decision causation question does
not ask the trier of fact to choose from sharply differing medical prefer-
ences nor to evaluate what effect small pieces of incremental medical risk
information would have had on the patient's decision. The jury does not
reproduce a decision-making process reflecting the exigencies of a
wrenching medical decision by asking how one piece of abstract risk in-
formation would have affected the decision. Deciding what value judg-
ment the patient would have made is more readily based on an evaluation
of the patient's religious and ethical beliefs, the patient's life-style, and
other matters that are more readily provable in the courtroom. In this
special kind of case, decision causation may be justiciable, and those
courts that have allowed substantial damages for failing to provide the
requisite information may have been justified in doing so. 9'
Recognizing an exception for cases in which differing nonmedical
values of patients make decision causation a justiciable issue does not
create the kind of exception that undermines the thesis of this article.
Admittedly, patients will always be able to contend that their differing
values would have led them to choose one form of therapy over another.
The crucial distinction is that before a court can determine whether the
particular values of a patient would have led that patient to a contrary
decision, the court must be able to predict with some confidence how that
189. See supra text following note 140.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
191. Decisions with regard to whether a woman would have decided to abort had her doctor
given her the requisite information are not unlike the decisions dealing with the cessation of life-
support systems when the patient is incompetent. Courts faced with deciding the hypothetical ques-
tion-what would this patient have decided had he been competent?-have looked to a broad range
of evidence to help determine the patient's subjective desires. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-62,
486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985) (in addition to all evidence of a plaintiff's actual statements on the
issue, the surrogate decision maker should consider a patient's religious beliefs or "patient's consis-
tent pattern of conduct with regard to prior decisions about his own medical care"). In wrongful
birth litigation, the jury is the surrogate decision maker, determining whether the mother would
have aborted. The same kind of wide-ranging evidence that courts consider in the life-support cases
is likely to inform this decision. Attempting to determine the result of a hypothetical idiosyncratic
decision about sharply conflicting medical preferences is far different.
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patient would have perceived and evaluated the risks of the alternative
therapies. Unless one has confidence in that prediction, engaging in the
process of determining how the patient's values would have affected his
decision is not possible. As demonstrated earlier, how patients perceive
and process information is unpredictable and subject to great variation.
Thus, no model for information processing will support a baseline upon
which value judgments can then operate. Nonetheless, one of the au-
thors, Cohen, believes that courts should allow plaintiffs to establish that
circumstances peculiar to the patient are so unusual that, with additional
information, the value judgment would have been made contrary to the
chosen therapy. Note that this approach would require the use of a sub-
jective test for causation. The objective standard would be meaningless
under such an approach because gauging either the irrationality or the
value system of an objectively reasonable person would be impossible.
On the other hand, Twerski believes that the complexity of the decision
process renders the decision causation question nonjusticiable when the
fact finder must gauge conflicting medical preferences. For Twerski, the
key to adequate protection of the right to decision making lies in building
sufficient deterrence into the law of informed choice-appropriately valu-
ing the right by identifying the serious emotional harm that emanates
from its denial.
5. Valuing Process and Malpractice Reform
No examination of medical informed consent can take place without
recognizing the crisis atmosphere that presently pervades medical mal-
practice litigation. The perception that traditional notions of personal
injury law do not function adequately are so widespread that legislatures
throughout the nation are seriously considering radical statutory reform.
No-fault proposals and other deviations from the traditional tort model
are in the offing. 192
Regardless of the advisability or necessity of these changes in mal-
practice law, they are largely inapposite to the process-based model of
informed consent proposed in this article. By moving the focus away
from personal injury to process rights, this model eliminates many of the
192. For early discussions on the subject, see J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 29-47
(1975); Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1973). The malprac-
tice crisis has spawned considerable interest in various types of no-fault proposals. See, e.g., FLOR-
IDA SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM AND A REVIEW
OF COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION (1988); O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Inju-
ries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
125; Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277.
Physician groups have propounded proposals for radically restructuring medical malpractice utiliz-
ing a fault-based system. See AM. MEDICAL ASs'N & SPECIALTY SOC'Y MEDICAL LIAB. PROJECT,
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY
DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1988); MEDICAL SOC'Y OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE PATIENTS' INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK (Working Draft Feb. 5, 1988).
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problems that are the object of the malpractice reform movement. 93
While we argue that process rights should be valued significantly, such
values are by their nature not likely to produce the exorbitant damages
which have fueled the movement for change.
As malpractice reform continues, one great danger is that it will be
overbroad. In the crisis atmosphere surrounding the reforms, legisla-
tures are not likely to be discriminating in setting the scope of their ac-
tions. They are likely to view all medical litigation as of one cloth.
Sweeping away the important process rights that we have identified in a
tide aimed at personal injury damages would be highly unfortunate.
V. CONCLUSION
Decision causation plays a pivotal role in the law of informed
choice. Courts appear unwilling to assess damages for the bad result that
follows an uninformed choice unless they believe that the patient, fully
informed, would have chosen against the therapeutic intervention.
Though scholars have suggested that courts abandon decision causation
as an element of the cause of action, no evidence shows that courts will
consider this approach. We believe that decision causation has retained
its vitality in informed choice litigation because it provides a key to sub-
stantial personal injury damages. If a court can conclude that, given ad-
ditional information, the patient would have refused the recommended
therapy, then the court can justify awarding damages for the undesirable
results of the therapy.
The justiciability of the decision causation issue depends on fashion-
ing a credible model of decision making. If we cannot confidently predict
how people perceive and process information for close-call decisions, we
cannot determine whether a given piece of information would have al-
tered the decision. Without an accurate model of decision making, the
decision causation issue is nothing more than a guessing game. This arti-
cle has demonstrated that reconstructing the patient's hypothetical deci-
sion process is virtually impossible and reshaping the doctor's duty to
193. Although the process-oriented model is not tied to artificial caps on recovery for the viola-
tion of the right, it recognizes that recovery of full personal injury damages is rarely, if ever, war-
ranted. To the extent that open-ended recovery for pain and suffering has driven the malpractice
crisis, the proposed model probably reduces the open-endedness of that kind of recovery substan-
tially. See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1986). Priest argues that the expansion of tort law to provide insurance for injuries even though
those injuries were unpreventable has led to the unravelling of insurance markets for a variety of
reasons. He suggests that we excise the insurance function from tort law and that the law of torts
concern itself solely with accident reduction. Once the law correctly identifies the process right
suggested herein, damages should be more susceptible to the kind of precise valuation that would
deter the undesired conduct. To the extent that the law of informed consent compensates for injuries
that would have taken place in any event (because plaintiff would have decided in favor of the
therapy), the compensation for such an injury serves only as insurance for an unpreventable injury.
Furthermore, the courts' failure to discount informed consent recoveries for injuries that might have
occurred had the alternative therapy been utilized also gives damages that are the equivalent of
insurance for unpreventable injuries. See Epstein, supra note 29, at 121 n.73.
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inform in order to compensate for patients' unpredictable decisions is
impractical.
Rather than focusing on decision causation, we suggest that courts
direct their attention to valuing the process of decision making, separate
and apart from the outcome of the decision. If doctors (or product man-
ufacturers) understood that the law encourages participation in decision
making, rather than avoidance of bad results attributable to undisclosed
risks, they would more likely foster that goal rather than create a paper
record to convince jurors that they disclosed a given piece of informa-
tion. The change in focus would not only identify and value the true
damage that occurs in informed choice cases, it would also communicate
to those responsible for sharing information the true harm they bring
about by their undesirable conduct. Today, the law sends a harsh and
irrational message to those whose conduct it seeks to alter. We suggest
that a message somewhat less harsh, but far more rational, will result in
the delivery of more information, and for the right reasons. In any event,
the change would spare us the silliness of litigating an issue which all
know to be a mirage. The law cannot lie with impunity without exacting
a heavy price. It need not do so. The truth is a quite acceptable
alternative.
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